Game theory, Max Weber, Leo Strauss, Mihály Polányi, political epistemology

This paper explores the applicability of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem to political theory by examining critiques of Max Weber’s principle of value neutrality. It analyses the positions of Leo Strauss and Michael Polanyi, arguing that their critiques function as game-theoretical equivalents of Gödelian propositions – true statements that cannot be formally proven within a given system. The study demonstrates how Strauss’s notion of the “crisis of modernity” and Polanyi’s idea of “personal knowledge” challenge the epistemological assumptions of Weberian rationalism. By linking formal logic with political philosophy, the paper proposes a new analytical framework for understanding the limits of value-neutrality in political science. It concludes by advocating for epistemological pluralism and the recognition of moral truth claims beyond formal systems.

TAKÁCS, M. PÉTER