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TRAUMA WITHOUT CATHARSIS?

CIVIL SOCIETY IN SERBIA BETWEEN MODERNIZATION AND (RE)TRADITIONALISM

MARKO BABIĆ*

Modernization is a word often used in public discourse in Serbia. Almost all, present and future, political issues are „contained” within this term. Modernization is presented by political and intellectual elites and mass-media as a „savior” for Serbian society which will help Serbia to finally find its place among other modern societies. On the other hand, a strong traditionalist tendency having direct normative force prevails when returning to the „roots” ,insisting on the reintegration of cultural-ethnic and institutional-political identity of Serbian society. This tension between „modernizers” and traditionalists enhances aspirations on both sides, deepening the gap between them due to failed expectations. Through a structural and comparative analysis current paper aims to interpret different approaches to modernization and (re)traditionalism within Serbian political and intellectual elites, as well as society today, including its political consequences and civil society still *under construction*. The paper insists on that through the efforts of fostering democratic culture, in post-authoritarian countries such as Serbia, civil societies can change basic beliefs of citizens ipso facto relaxing the axiological confrontation between „modernizers” and (re)traditionalists.

Modernization

The word modernization comes from the ancient word *modernus*, which meant current reality versus *antiquus* (pagan past). According to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, modernization, in sociology, stands for the transformation from a traditional, rural, agrarian society to a secular, urban, industrial society.¹

Communists called an idea of rapid development and economic catching up with the West – industrialization. In the 1960s and 70s communists started to use the word modernization not only understood as industrialization but also covering wider social reforms – economic, institutional, educational and health reforms, in order to make their countries more developed. Communist modernization in this regard – failed. Interestingly, they understood modernization as a process in which less developed societies take on characteristics of Western societies in the fields of technology, science, public administration, education, medical care, etc. but not market economy, separation of powers, civil society, human rights or freedom.

However, is it relevant to take only a few elements that benefit us and avoid those that do not benefit us in order to finalize the process of modernization? According to one of the major theoretical perspectives in sociology, *functionalism*, it was not possible. It treats modern society as a whole being much more than just a sum of its parts. It is not possible to develop certain parts of society neglecting others if the goal is a

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¹ <http://www.britannica.com/topic/modernization> (accessed: June 21, 2015)



developed and stable society. If one part of the society is dysfunctional it affects all other parts and creates social problems. Functionalist notions of modernization were based on the ideal-type distinction between traditional and modern societies. A modern society is not only more technologically advanced than the traditional but it is a completely different, regimented society. So, it was not merely the question of different technological levels of production but there were different institutions, human relations and other significant social values.² It was not far away from there that modernization was understood as a total social process of development. While Neil Smelser,³ Marion Levy,⁴ Shmuel Eisenstadt⁵ have made modernization one of the fundamental theoretical issues, Martin Weiner⁶ has precisely defined it as a harmonized development of crucial parts of a social system – economy, politics, management and culture. Smelser further develops this idea of modernization and turns it into the „modernization in the six fields”: The first field is where economic modernization involves scientific knowledge in production, the transition from small to a market economy, urbanization. The second one is a political field, which means construction of the national state, efficient administration and democratic institutions. The third one is education, which means the expansion of literacy and general education in the population. The fourth one is religious which sees secularization as its main process. The fifth one is family life, implying the suppression of kinship at the cost of increasing specialization of roles. The sixth is stratification, with the supremacy of „acquired” instead of „ascribed” status.⁷ Today, these functionalist notions viewing modernity as the totality of social process of development have deep roots in social sciences. Therefore, it is considered that causes of Communist modernization failure lie exactly in its partiality.

If we apply the above elements in the case of Serbia as a former communist state (a republic within the former Yugoslav federation), we come to the following conclusions: Serbia *de facto* came out of Communism as an industrialized country where a change in the social structure was made – peasantry was no longer a major social layer.⁸ During Communist rules wide urbanization was carried out, as well as modern transportation network and state administration was established. Health and education were also improved. On the other hand, Serbia's economy in the Communist era served ideological (political), rather than productive purposes, there were work ethos, no division of power, no rule of law, state administration was unsuccessful and expensive,

² Sztompka Piotr: *The Sociology of Social Change*. Blackwell, Oxford/Cambridge 1993 pp. 72-73

³ Smelser, Neil: *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1959

⁴ Levy, Marion Jr.: *Modernization and the Structure of Societies*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1966

⁵ Eisenstadt, Shmuel, N.: *Modernization and Conditions of Sustained Growth*, World Politics No. 16 (July) (1964) pp. 576-594

⁶ Weiner, Martin: *Modernization*, Basic Books, London/New York 1966

⁷ Smelser, Neil: *Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development*, Aldine Co., Chicago 1966; Process of social change, in: Smelser Neil (ed.), *Sociology: An Introduction*, Wiley, New York, 709-762

⁸ This is important as since the 19th century Serbian society had been an agrarian society (almost without its civil component) with a strong social and national ideology as its integrative factor. The creator of the State was the Nation which in social terms meant peasantry in Serbia. The State was people's, ruled by the people through people's party in people's democracy. This was a sort of *Volksgemeinschaft*, *people's community* where an authoritarian type of government was legitimate.

collectivism surpassed individuality by far. Such modernization is described by Piotr Sztompka as „fake modernization”.⁹

It seems that in Serbia problems of modernization are also related to its political elites. There is a general consensus that modernization and the European Union accession remain the main tasks of Serbian politics. All relevant political parties¹⁰ in Serbia advocate this strategy. „Modernization will be the key word in the next 10 years in Serbia” said Serbia's Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić in his inaugural address in 2014.¹¹ However, there are serious problems with the Serbian political elite converting these declarative statements into reality. Their ideological and political fixations produce endless quarrels. There is irreconcilable hostility between the ruling parties and the opposition (regardless of who currently runs the country). If a democratic system is based on competition among political elites, then the current Serbian political elite's struggle for power has completely covered their perception of the others, and what is even more of concern, their political goals, as well. It seems as if it is more important that a hostile party does not control an institution than that this institution exists and functions successfully. A vast amount of social and political energy is being wasted on sterile rivalry and endless arguing.

Another problem with modernization in Serbia is related to the understanding of its meaning, as well as on its ideological acceptance. That part of the political elite that seems to be the most interested in modernization understands it merely through privatization and other partial reforms in economy. Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić claims in the same inaugural speech that „the first and most important goal is to transform our economy, as it is the only way to achieve a better standard over a longer period. The three key tasks of the new government will be economic reforms conducted through the set of law reform, strengthening our private sector and budget consolidation”.¹² Pointless to say, two-thirds of his exposé was concerned with questions on the economy. As stated earlier, modernization cannot be reduced to mere improvements in the economy. Political, social and cultural elements of modernization are equally important. Even worse, these same „pro-modernization” political elites tend to establish ideological monopoly over the idea of modernization by which any criticism of their role in the political life is a subject of accusations for being in

⁹ Sztompka, Piotr, op. cit. p.137

¹⁰ In his „Typology of Party Systems” Sartori provides two specific rules for determining the relevance of a particular party: 1. a minor party can be discounted as irrelevant whenever it remains over time superfluous, in the sense that it is never needed or put to use for any feasible coalition majority; 2. a party qualifies for relevance whenever its existence, or appearance, affects the tactics of party competition and particularly when it alters the direction of the competition. In his view, a party only needs to exhibit one of these qualities to be considered relevant. (Sartori, Giovanni, *Typology of Party Systems* (1976), in: Peter, Mair (ed.), *The West European Party System*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1990 pp. 316-349. Opposed to this were authors such as Blondel (Blondel, Jean, *Types of Party Systems* [1968], ibidem pp. 302-310) or Rokkan (Rokkan, Stein, *The Electoral Balance* [1970], ibidem pp. 311-315) who based their analysis on the number of seats obtained in the series of Lower House elections or on electoral thresholds. For the purpose of this paper I include both approaches when consider relevant parties in Serbia.

¹¹ <http://www.e-novine.com/srbija/vesti/102566-Ekspoz-e-premijera-Srbije.html> (accessed: June 20, 2015)

¹² Ibidem.

opposition towards modernization.¹³ This unfortunately applies to all ruling elites in Serbia after 2000, as well as to the fall of Slobodan Milošević's regime.

Traditionalism

Unlike tradition understood as a historical and cultural heritage by which beliefs, customs, ideas construct identity of a society, traditionalism unilaterally overemphasized traditional values and patriarchy. It is a non-critical awareness of the tradition which glorifies the past and restores historical myths. Traditionalism confronts the idea and the process of modernization in terms of closing the society in itself, introduces the idea of autarchy as opposed to the open society. It proposes homogenization versus self-differentiation; the dominance of one (in this case) political subsystem above other subsystems. It also promotes very strong resistance to social change. In other words, it emphasizes affectivity contrary to affective neutrality and universalism contrary to particularism.¹⁴ Traditional society therefore directs people towards collectivist axiology and requires subordination to the supreme goals of the collectivity at the expense of the needs and interests of individuals. Paying respect to the authority of the head of state is perceived as a fair *pater familias*.

Yet, this cannot be exclusively linked to political actors because there is one factor called overdetermination. It can be found in political cultures. In the focus of not only Serbian but, let's call it the „Balkan culture” as a whole, it is a holistic view of the world with the Nation at the top level. The roots of Serbian culture are deeply immersed in the oral literature of the Middle Ages and the Orthodox faith.¹⁵ Therefore, each project of individualization of life must be prepared to face these obstacles. Holism¹⁶ in the

¹³ Obviously, this problem is strictly related to the issue of responsibility in politics. Andrew Heywood explains in his *Politics* (Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire/New York 2002 (second ed.) that the concept of responsibility can be understood in two ways. It can mean behavior of a reasonable, prudent and morally justifiable way in the case when a person is under pressure to behave differently. But, it also implies the responsibility to be open to other people's criticism. Responsibility requires strictly defined duties, powers and functions of appropriate bodies so that the work of subordinates can be successfully monitored and evaluated. Therefore, the responsibility can function only within the framework of constitutionalism and respect for the rules. Being responsible does not mean to be a subject to arbitrary power or unpredictable penalties. In other words, various circumstances and pressures cannot exempt anyone from responsibility for imprudent, unreasonable and immoral behavior in setting up political and ideological goals and means for achieving those goals. Indeed, succumbing to pressure also represents a form of irresponsibility. But we should not forget either that global circumstances, increasingly resembling a system of *organized irresponsibility*, also encourage irresponsibility. There still is no firm global institutional framework that would dictate strict rules enabling to correctly evaluate activities. Needless to say, it is grist to the mill for local elites to behave as they do.

¹⁴ Larrain, Jorge: *Traditionalism*, The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth Century Social Thought, Blackwell 1993 p. 393

¹⁵ Аврамовић, Зоран: *Српска културна свест у сопственом огледалу*, Зборник књижевно филозофске школе, No. 1 Крушевац 1994

¹⁶ Apparently first used by South African general and statesman Jan Christiaan Smuts in *Holism and Evolution* first published in 1926 where he explains that: „Holism as a process is not only creative but self-creative, and its final structures are far more holistic than its initial structures. Natural wholes are always composed by parts; in fact the whole is not some entity additional to the parts, but is just the parts in their synthesis, not static but dynamic, evolutionary, creative (...) Hence

political life used to have a form of class interests and later national interests. Though, it was usually associated with aggression and intolerance towards differences. Civil individualism has always been a scarce commodity in the Balkans.

The existence of strong cultural and political archetypes rooted deeply in immediate and distant historical understanding of the world could be a useful tool when explaining why many Serbian intellectuals easily converted into a field of collectivist policies.¹⁷ Power of traditionalism and failure of civic society was not merely a lack of political will of intellectuals in Serbia. Contemplations over the Citizen, the Nation and the State clearly expressed a century old fostered culture of a holistic type.

The influence of traditionalism in Serbia can be analyzed through inherited traditionalism of peasantry that included over 74% of the entire population¹⁸ after the Second World War. This shows that there was a link between traditionalism and authoritarian communism in the period between 1945 and 1990. For example, low level of literacy and education easily explain why the Citizen was not able to constitute itself as the decisive player in the process of modernization and democratization. On the other hand, the very rapid industrialization in the first decades after World War II resulted in a great demand for labour which could be found only in peasantry. The outcome was an „exodus” from villages to cities and an unavoidable „ruralization” of urban areas. Along with the high level of illiteracy (although decreasing over the years),¹⁹ it has also influenced a rather shallow perception of modernization understood as the industrialization of the Soviet type, without creating the necessary democratic institutions such as modern state, authentic parliamentary system rather than formal institutions of democratic decision-making, free public opinion, etc. It enabled the paternalistic state to claim protection of its subjects but, at the same time, entitled to restrict their freedom. It demands paying respect to the authority of the leader. Therefore, the half transformed peasantry and „rural” working class in Serbia not only accepted but also expressed solidarity rather with their own political leaders than with the working class „counterparts” in Croatia or Slovenia when Federal Yugoslavia collapsed in the early 1990s.

A process of re-traditionalisation can also be observed in the Serbian society in the context of nationalist ideology emergence and the creation of national states in the

Evolution has an ever-deepening inward spiritual holistic character; and the wholes of Evolution and the evolutionary process itself can only be understood in reference to this fundamental character of wholeness. This is a world of whole-making”. Another words, Holism is the tendency in nature to form wholes that are greater than the sum of the parts through creative evolution. In: *Holism and Evolution*, MacMillan & Co. (third edition), London 1936 p. 86

¹⁷ In this regard one may refer to the article: *Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition* by Richard E. Nisbett, Kaiping Peng, Incheol Choi, Ara Norenzayan in: *Psychological Review*, Vol. 108, No. 2 2001. The Authors find East Asians to be holistic compared to Westerners who are more analytic. They argue that the „considerable social differences that exist among different cultures affect not only their beliefs about specific aspects of the world but also (a) their naive metaphysical system at a deep level (b) their tacit epistemologies and (c) even the nature of their cognitive processes – the ways by which they know the world”. p. 291

¹⁸ Djedović, Dajana, *Kulturna politika i ideologija vs. seoska kultura*, in: *Zbornik radova Fakulteta dramskih umetnosti* No. 13/14 (2008), Beograd p. 310

¹⁹ From 22% in 1961 to 15% in 1981 and 3,5% in 2002. In: *Слика неписмености у Србији*, Демографски преглед, Vol. 4 (2003) No. 16 Београд, p. 1

former Yugoslavia after 1990. In both cases, culture was among the most important causes of the phenomenon.

This situation, to a certain extent, resembles 'Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*,²⁰ in which he claims that individuals can best ensure their self-preservation by giving all power to a sovereign. In Hobbes' interpretation this can be a single person, an assembly, etc., but regardless of its form all the powers have to be combined and concentrated in it. If not, then man will return to the state of nature where „there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently, not culture of the earth, no navigation, nor the use of commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, co society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”²¹

In this regard, there is an interesting connection between those two historical contexts of traditionalism in Serbian history. The process of re-traditionalization tries to establish a new mythological cult, a kind of metaphysics and pathos of the past in the place of the earlier Communist-type cult of revolution that had encouraged self-oblivion of its own tradition and culture. While being anti-communist, re-traditionalization gives support to various collectivist forms, indicating acceptance of ethnocentric limitations of human thought. It is not difficult to conclude that this new kind of tribalism must have also included an anti-Western discourse. Therefore, there is no compromise between the predestined special community rooted in Byzantine culture with the Western atomistic individualism that gives individual rights precedence over the common good and a common destiny.

From an anthropological point of view, it can be noticed that a traditional-patriarchal society and authoritarian political regimes favored the formation of an authoritarian mentality seen as uncritical acceptance of and obedience to the authority (first party leader and the party's state, later national leaders and the national state). Authoritarian mentality is characterized by a strong collective identification as a compensation for unrealized personal identity, therefore, anti-individualism is an essential feature of the dominant „social character” of the society. Adorno and colleagues²² have already remarked „authoritarian personality” as the dominant type of stereotypical, biased mindset representing Manichaeian view of the world and people (we-they, weak-strong, etc.). On that basis it is difficult to build a civil society based on citizens developed as free personalities, on openness and freedom of communication and tolerance. It is important to notice that the very existence of democratic institutions can easily be abused by the ruling party if there are no citizens aware of their rights and freedoms who are able to use them in a democratic way.

Civil Society in Serbia

²⁰ Hobbes, Thomas: *Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil*, Shapiro Ian (ed.), Yale University Press 2010

²¹ Ibidem XIII. 9.

²² Adorno, Theodore, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, Nevit Sanford: *The Authoritarian Personality*, Harper & Row, New York 1950

Serbia's society today is pinched between modernization and (re)traditionalism processes, probably more than ever in its history. Therefore, I believe that it seems necessary to analyze two major factors that influence the condition and „quality” of civil society in Serbia – political parties and NGO. Their influence is decisive²³ for civil society's emergence in the post-authoritarian times and as a support for institutional reforms given by formed political consciousness of citizens. Democratic consolidation, as a *conditio sine qua non* for modernization, understood not only through its economic dimension but through citizens' attitude towards democratic values as well, remains a substantial indicator of consolidation.

In this context, it should be noted that something I would define as *fear of democracy* exists in the Serbian society. The belief that only a „firm hand” can solve accumulated social problems prevails in public opinion as well as in intellectual circles. The state of civil society is not encouraging, either. The enthusiasm for social change waned after the fall of Milošević's regime in 2000 and „constrained” civil society from the field of politics. Does democracy as such become the „unwanted” in the process of transition along with its axiology again? After the Millennium there were overall expectations that the level of citizens' trust in democratic institutions would be growing but it turned out to be its exact opposite. In a CeSID²⁴ study concerning the presidential elections of 2007/2008, 27% of respondents claimed complete disinterest for politics, while 17% claimed to have no time for politics.²⁵ On the other hand, the same study showed that a significant number of citizens took part in this election. Among those who claimed disinterest in politics, 53% participated in the elections; those who claimed that „do not understand much of politics”, took part in 73%. At the same time, 94% of citizens feel that their influence on the policy is negligible.²⁶ These seemingly controversial data indicate citizens' attitude towards politics and political institutions. On one hand, the attitude is highly emotional, while, at the same time, is marked by fatalism, lack of trust in political actors, as well as citizens' own power to influence political events. This state of affairs requires an answer to the question of whether civic consciousness expressed in the 1990s in Serbia was truly „civil”? Was it based on a real desire of citizens to achieve democratic society and build democratic institutions? It seems that the political consciousness of citizens at that time had been rather „anti-regime” than was based on a positive attitude towards democracy. After the fall of the hated authoritarian regime, an expected political abstinence replaced the earlier political engagement of citizens. Citizens were left on their own, confronting with the lack of individual capacities for further democratic endeavors. They have never lived in a democratic society and neither had opportunity to experience benefits of that kind of political order, or to build an appropriate level of democratic literacy. Democracy then was desired as a

²³ There are of course other factors such as civil society education within national educational system or syndicates as, inter alia, „schools” for gaining knowledge of transition processes – as equally important. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper I decided to analyze the two mentioned above.

²⁴ CeSID (The Center for Free Elections and Democracy, Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju) is a non-governmental, non-profit organization established in 1997 in Serbia dealing, inter alia, with election monitoring in the country. Their official website at: www.cesid.org

²⁵ Hrnjaz, Miloš, *Izborna participacija i apstinencija*, in: Mihajlović, Srećko (ed.), *Oko izbora*, CeSID, Beograd 2007, p. 60

²⁶ Ibidem.

prosperous economic and political order but not as a society with the rule of law and accountability. It is indicative that all citizens' initiatives against the regime were labeled as „democratic”, but as a matter of fact, they were only civil unrests. Knowledge and a positive attitude towards democracy and its values were mostly absent. A logical consequence has been a prevailing cynicism towards democratic political institutions and lack of trust in democracy as a political order. It seems that citizens in Serbia, just like in Plato's allegory of the cave, prefer to stay in the „shadow” of an authoritarian mentality fearing a dramatic exit from the cave to the „daylight” of the rule of law.

Similarly, a not very affirmative approach can be observed in regard to non-governmental organizations (NGO) operating in Serbia in the previous twenty five years. Interestingly, Serbia has had a long history of non-governmental organizations dating back to the XIX century, mostly backed by the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian Royal Family. In the early XX century, social functioning of citizens was comprised of traditional forms of rural solidarity but also of various activities of the Serbian Orthodox Church and many other societies.²⁷ The fact that free associations of citizens²⁸ had been banned since 1945 by the Communists proved the potential danger they might have posed to the authoritarian communist system. Nevertheless, during Tito's era some forms of civic association were still manifested. For example, in the form of organization of the workers' strikes in 1958, student riots in Belgrade in 1954 and in Zagreb in 1959, the Yugoslav student protest in 1968, etc. Therefore, it seemed logical that the process of democratization that started in 1990 would have been accompanied by a revival of the third sector which was repressed during communist rule.

Since the 1990s, the perception of NGOs functioning has been loaded with controversies. The suspicion that is expressed towards NGOs is almost proverbial. Though it must be admitted that some partial skepticism might be justified. For example, Zoran Avramović argues that functions of the Belgrade Open School, the Soros Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Foundation and other NGOs operating in Serbia (and across the Balkans) are spreading faith in Western democratic values, where „the conceptual source of education for civil society is located in western societies and their theories (...) and their main role is Westernization of citizens in Serbia.”²⁹ Mihajlo Marković notices that functioning of civil society organizations in Serbia is essentially based on the paradigm of „colonization” by the global operations of the NGOs.³⁰ He gives examples such as the Tavistock Institute in London, Aspen Institute, Stanford Research Institute, George Soros' Open Society Fund. According to him, non-governmental organizations „(...) undermine democracy, undermine parliamentary systems and try to impose itself over them.”³¹ Smilja Avramov also notices the „colonizing” assumptions when it comes to the nature of functioning of non-governmental organizations in Serbia. According to her, such organizations have

²⁷ Radojičić, Mirjana, *Istorija u krivom ogledalu*, Institut za političke studije, Beograd 2009 p. 9

²⁸ Others than those recognized by the official state ideology.

²⁹ Аврамовић, Зоран, *Образовање за грађанско друштво или демократија*, Зборник Института за педагошка истраживања 38 (2) December 2006 p. 449

³⁰ In fact, he points out that the emergence of a large number of NGOs after the Second World War was caused by Great Britain's desire to control its colonies.

³¹ Marković, Mihajlo, *Nevladine organizacije u svetu i Srbiji*, in: Jovanović, Živadin, Brčín, Dragutin (eds.), *Nevladine organizacije u Srbiji i svetu*, Beogradski forum za svet ravnopravnih, Beograd 2006 p. 13

entered the post-Communist Eastern countries with the task of changing the consciousness of the citizens.³²

Although the above mentioned statements are true to a certain extent, it should also be noticed that this set of attitudes towards NGOs is based on a limited interpretation of the nature and functions of NGOs. In addition to the advocacy for human rights, NGO's often take various political stances (which the above mentioned authors criticize them for), but the undeniable importance of these organizations also needs to be taken into account. The given critical thinking ignores the following most important function of non-governmental organizations that they have in establishing a civil society: they are institutionalized forms of expression of civic awareness of the important political issues. Or at least, they should be. It seems that these critical tones are primarily ideological: NGOs are presented as „Western” organizations, being „individualistic and devastating for the state”, as well as a „tool of globalization”, etc. None of these determinants are ontological, which means that they do not explain much of NGO's 'being' (its basic structure and function) neither explain NGOs internal structure or their position in relation to the state, society and citizens. The determinants fail to explain programs, statutes or set of beliefs which each individual NGO advocates. In other words, these critical determinations cannot be related to the civil society itself but to the mythic image of what these organizations have acquired since the 1990s in Serbia.

The perception of politics and political actors is also marked, to a significant extent, by negative connotations. Their roots can be found in history. Hostility and distrust has followed political parties in Serbia since the early stages of their formation in the XIX and early XX century. Ruling dynasties in Serbia perceived political parties as an usurpation of their sovereign power. Desimir Tošić noticed that „all three of our dynasties struggled against our political parties either in independent states such as Montenegro and Serbia after 1878 or later in Yugoslavia 1918-1941”.³³ Dynasties³⁴ were greatly supported by such institutions as the army and the church, naturally inclined to the monarchy. Perhaps the most important „contribution” to this already traditional mistrust towards political parties in Serbia was the period of the Communist regime between 1945 and 1991. The regime created hostility for free engagement in politics through indoctrination. In his paper entitled *Demokratija još ne stanuje ovde*³⁵ [Democracy still does not live here], Zoran Stojiljković finds the anti-party sentiments prevalent in Serbia in two causes. The first cause is a *reactive* anti-party sentiment caused by actual experiences that citizens gained after restoring multiparty system in Serbia in 1991. The second is a *cultural* anti-party sentiment conditioned by tradition and a system of values and beliefs. All of this produced a controversial attitude towards politics in Serbia:

³² Avramov, Smilja, *Kako su nastale nevladine organizacije u Srbiji*, in: Jovanović, Živadin, Brčín, Dragutin (eds.), *Nevladine organizacije u Srbiji i svetu*, Beogradski forum za svet ravnopravnih, Beograd 2006 pp. 10-11

³³ Tošić, Desimir, *Političke stranke i demokratija u Srbiji*, in: Lutovac, Zoran (ed.), *Demokratija u političkim strankama Srbije*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd, 2006 p.14

³⁴ The Obrenović's dynasty that ruled Serbia from 1817 to 1842 and again from 1858 to 1903; The Karadjordjević's dynasty 1804-1914, 1842-1858, 1903-1945; The Petrović-Njegoš dynasty that ruled in Montenegro 1696-1918.

³⁵ Stojiljković, Zoran, *Demokratija još ne stanuje ovde*, in: Lutovac, Zoran (ed.), *Demokratija u političkim strankama Srbije*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd, 2006 p.123

Politics is treated as an immoral activity, while politicians are the most popular personalities in the society! Politics is a privilege conducted by privileged social layers and a means to achieve social impact. At the same time, there is something „disgusting” from which *moral* citizens and *honest* intellectuals should keep away. The Communist era was marked by the inability of the political elite to solve accumulated economic and social problems and in the end, directly or indirectly, it resulted in the disintegration of the common state. Therefore, attitudes towards politics as an *activity that can never solve problems*, permanently stabilized.

The inner structure of a modern party (especially those in transitional societies) is often marked by authoritarianism. In other words, undemocratic behavior is justified for the purposes of political effectiveness. Robert Michels' thought that „the modern party is a fighting organization in the political sense of the term, and must as such conform to the laws of tactics”³⁶ complies a great deal with the Serbian post-authoritarian society. This kind of discourse suggests that a political party in Serbia which respects democratic dialogues and freedom of opinion within its own ranks would be incapable of sharp political competition. Therefore, there is lack of political pluralism within a party, a lack of responsibility towards the society, and finally, a belief that only a monolithic party is able to win and preserve power. In practice, after winning an election, their power crystallizes into an unchanging structure insensitive to any internal democratic dialogue or needs of the society. Serbian reality is that political parties not only ignore their function for a „formal” democratic education but their behavior results in indoctrination of citizens, political discouragement and apathy. Low turnout of citizen vote in most of the elections after 2000 favors party bureaucracies as it guarantees predictable results and preserves the current balance of power. Politics have become a „company” with a secure workplace for professional politicians. Often local branches of political parties in Serbia (even those with a democratic image) serve as „purgatory”, which effectively determines a selection between *the loyal* and *the competent*. The result is lack of motivation for citizens to participate in political process. Unfortunately, all possible pro-social, activist and democratic behavior learned at school, family and involvement in the local community make no sense when confronted with the monolithic political society, which, by its undemocratic behavior, excludes citizens from political participation.

Conclusion

Obviously, there is an axiological confrontation between the process of modernization and (re)traditionalism within the Serbian political elite and a society as a whole. Neither one is understood in a comprehensive and holistic manner. Therefore it is a great challenge to build a civil society in Serbia between these two axiological platforms.

However, modernization in Serbia understood as the establishment of democratic institutions and an open market economy as an integral part of the European Union institutions seems to be an appropriate formula. Political and intellectual elites focusing on this goal and leaving all other general and particular objectives aside is the right path for the success of the modernization project in Serbia. Obviously, even with a clear

³⁶ Michels, Robert, *Political Parties, A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, Batoche Books, Kitchener, Ontario 2001 p. 31

consensus among the elites it is not an easy task. Successful modernization requires a lot of effort and prudence but primarily self-discipline among the elites. This includes resignation of personal benefits for the sake of the fulfillment of the overall objectives. The biggest challenge for the modernization project in Serbia is traditionalism prone to glorification of the nation and its conception of patriotism that insists on the cult of *blood and soil*, a common language, origin and maintenance of distinctive traditions as a closed universe. The insistence on the radical individuality and deeply-rooted difference compared to other cultures implies demands for homogenization of its own culture. At the political level it introduces an „us-them” (friend-enemy) dichotomy. This concept will prevail in Serbia leaving citizens to decide on free and democratic elections. There is a role of civil society with its fostering of democratic culture resulting in a change of basic political beliefs of citizens. This is especially important in post-authoritarian countries such as Serbia. In general, a successful democratic transition and consolidation is conditioned with two general changes. The first is institutional, which is often the subject of public discourse and policy focus of all governments, the other one is related to the establishment of a lasting and widely accepted political culture.

What seems to be the most important conclusion for Serbia's elites and society is that the political need for modernization and democratic identity is not negated by other identities such as national pride and patriotism, which are concepts of traditionalist' axiology. It determines them as the *second degree identities* with respect to the basic position of man in a democratic society which is a position of the Citizen. The fact that modern and contemporary democracies were in conjunction with the *national awakening* cannot be disputed. The preservation of national culture is also an important task of democratic endeavor. However, true democratic participation cannot exist when various collective identities dominate the rule of law. In developed democracies a civil society enables the transfer and implementation of numerous individual and group needs of citizens that the state is unable to process. The idea of civil society is not about controlling political order or serving citizens. It also provides a concrete base for the formation and preservation of democratic political awareness. Therefore, civil society is not only a *temporary installation* that would lose its function after the consolidation of democracy. It is a lasting, authentic part of a democratic political system and *condition sine qua non* for modernization projects understood not only through economic development.

THE EUROPEAN UNION – WESTERN BALKANS RELATIONS

WITH THE SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE CASE OF SERBIA

MAJA CRNIĆ*

The distinctive relationship of the European Union towards countries of the region of South East Europe can be seen, among other things, through the special term the EU uses for denoting these countries- Western Balkans (WB). This is not only a geopolitical term but also a name constructed to label countries whose accession is pending- former republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), with the exception of Slovenia which became a Member State in the “Big bang” accession in 2004, and Albania. Since Croatia acceded to European Union in 2013, it is no longer included in this term, either. That is why the term Western Balkans Six (WB6) is also used in official documents alongside with the term Western Balkans.

The relationship of the European Union towards Western Balkan countries is shaped according to the geopolitical reasons and social situation of the region. It is greatly influenced by the process of disintegration of the SFRY, which was a consequence of the bloody civil wars in the period between 1992 and 1995. This unfortunate situation led not only to a special stance toward this region but it also influenced the accession process of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and it made the EU realize the shortcomings of its Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Stabilisation and Association Partnership

Considering the dissolution of the SFRY and the internal problems in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania, the EU adopted a new political approach with a goal of contributing to the economic development, stabilisation and reconciliation of the region. Having this in mind, the Commission proposed a new relationship model in 1999: Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which was approved by the Council of Ministers of the EU. The initial discussion on the SAP was conducted at the summit in Santa Maria de Feira, held in June 2000, when the EU granted the status of potential candidates to countries of Western Balkans (with the exception of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, whose participation was conditioned).¹ The decision was also taken to institute a political forum which would consist of periodical high level meetings between the head of states and governments of the EU member states and the countries of the Western Balkans.

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¹As it was stated in the Conclusions of Santa Maria de Feira Summit: “A democratic, cooperative FRY living in peace with its neighbours will be a welcome member of the European family of democratic nations. The European Council supports the civil society initiatives as well as the democratic forces in Serbia in their struggle to achieve this goal and urges them to stay united and reinforce their cooperation. The Union looks forward to the time when the FRY will be able to participate fully in the Stabilisation and Association process.”

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei1_en.htm 23 August 2015



The first such summit was held in Zagreb in 2000, which marks the beginning of SAP for the Western Balkans. The Zagreb Summit resulted in the adoption of a Declaration which reaffirmed the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries and confirmed the status of potential candidate countries for the Western Balkans.² This process was strengthened at the second EU-WB Summit in Thessaloniki in 2003, where the *Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving towards European integration* was adopted.³ This Agenda, inspired by the Accession Partnerships in CEE countries, introduces European Partnership for each country of this region, taking the specificities of the SAP⁴ into account. It consisted of short and long-term priorities for economic, institutional, political and other reforms, which were then transposed into Action plans with concrete measures and time frameworks for their realization.⁵ Besides the adoption of the Agenda, the Thessaloniki summit also expanded the EU-WB political forum through the introduction of the annual meetings of ministers of foreign affairs, ministers of internal affairs and ministers in charge of the judiciary of EU member states and WB countries. Furthermore, it envisaged the introduction of technical assistance to WB countries, mainly through the twinning programme (direct professional assistance provided by the administrative officers of the Member States) and TAIEX- Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office, in order to ensure the transposition of the EU *acquis* into the legal systems of Western Balkan countries.⁶

The SAP rests on several instruments: bilateral Stabilisation and Association Agreements, autonomous trade measures (implemented only until the entry into force of the Interim Agreement),⁷ financial assistance, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations.⁸

Stabilisation and Association Agreement

The most important SAP instrument is the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), the improved Europe Agreement (the Association Agreement of CEE countries). The difference is that SAA contains novel chapters on mandatory regional cooperation, judiciary and internal affairs and conditions which are consequences of the previous association experience.⁹ It consists of a preamble and nine chapters- Political dialogue; Regional cooperation; Free movement of goods; Free movement of workers,

² *Vodič kroz pristupanje Srbije Evropskoj uniji* [Guide through the Accession of Serbia to the European Union], International and Security Affairs Center, Belgrade. 2015, p. 19.

³ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm, 28 April 2015

⁴ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/76201.pdf 23 August 2015

⁵ Mišćević, Tanja, *Pridruživanje Evropskoj uniji* [EU Association]. Službeni Glasnik, Belgrade, 2009. p. 165.

⁶ Miscevic, Tanja, *Pridruživanje Evropskoj uniji* [EU Association]. Službeni Glasnik, Belgrade, 2009. p. 165.

⁷ Autonomous trade measures, introduced through EU unilateral action, provide customs free export into the EU market. Todorović, Bojana, Davidović, Milanka, Sretić, Zoran, *Ekonomsko- privredni vodič kroz Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju* [Economic guide through the Stabilisation and Association Agreement], ISAC Fond, Belgrade 2008. P.12

⁸ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/sap_en.htm, 28 April 2015

⁹ Mišćević, Tanja, *Pridruživanje Evropskoj uniji* [EU Association]. Službeni Glasnik, Belgrade, 2009. p. 152

services, capital, business establishment; Law harmonisation, application of competition regulations; Justice, freedom, security; Cooperation policies; Financial cooperation; Association institutions, basic and final provisions. In addition, a significant number of annexes and declarations are adopted for the refinement of certain provisions. The SAA is basically an agreement for the gradual establishment of a free trade area between the EU and associated countries. Likewise, the SAA fosters law harmonisation, regional cooperation and establishment of a framework for the deepening of relations in various fields.

What is very interesting with regard to the SAA is the fact that the basic principles of this agreement, e.g. rule of law, democracy, human and minority rights, market economy, etc. are legally binding.¹⁰ Additionally, in case of infringement of these principles, the SAA can be suspended, and even terminated through the activation of the cancellation clause (this, however, has not been applied so far). Another distinctive feature of the SAA is that regional cooperation was made mandatory and one of the preconditions for the continuation of cooperation with the EU.

Considering the fact that the SAA is a “mixed agreement”, i.e. it has to be ratified not only by the EU and the country party to the agreement but also by every Member State of the EU, it takes a long time for this agreement to enter into force. Because of this complex and lengthy ratification process, until the SAA comes into force, the relationship between the EU and the aspirant country is regulated by the Interim Agreement, which is concluded between the EU and the country in question. This kind of an agreement only covers those policies within the exclusive competences of the EU- mostly trade issues.

The process of signing of the SAA in Western Balkan countries went as follows: the first country to sign the SAA was the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001, Croatia followed shortly afterwards just a few months later in the same year; Albania concluded the agreement in 2006, Montenegro in 2007, and Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2008. It took a few years to ratify these agreements and till this date, the SAA with Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet not entered into force. For the rest of the countries the SAAs entered into force in the following order: FYR of Macedonia in 2004, Croatia 2005, Albania 2009, Montenegro 2010 and Serbia in 2013. Here it can also be mentioned, that the EU started negotiations for the conclusion of the SAA with Kosovo in 2013.

Financial assistance

Regarding financial assistance, the framework for this SAP instrument was established in 2000. The single framework for assistance to the countries of Western Balkans- CARDS programme (Community assistance for reconstruction, development and stabilisation)- was set up for the period of 2000-2006. It combined the existing PHARE programme for non-accession candidates and OBNOVA to thereby create greater transparency and efficiency.¹¹ Resources contained in these programmes amounted to

¹⁰ With regard to the human rights, since 1995 the EU in all its agreements with non-Member states includes human rights clause which enables it to impose sanctions or to suspend trade concessions in case of human rights violations. Craig, Paul, de Burca, Grainne, *EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011. p.392

¹¹ <http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ead/misc/ffd2000/Financial.pdf>, 28 April 2015

4.65 billion Euros and were intended for economic and social development, building up of public institutions and administration, better living standards, education, improvement of environmental conditions and transnational cooperation. The aid was made available not only for the central government but also for local level governments and civil society organisations. The CARDS programme was replaced with Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). What is specific for this programme is that it is unique for all candidate and potential candidate countries to the EU and its procedures are uniform, which helps the Commission in the allocation of resources.¹² It is also important to stress that the amount of financial aid is in accordance with the level of progress in relations with the EU. IPA is divided into 5 different components: Assistance for transition and institution building; Cross-border and regional cooperation (with EU Member States and other countries eligible for IPA); Regional development (transport, environment, regional and economic development); Human resource development (strengthening human capital and combating exclusion); and finally, Rural development.¹³ It is important to emphasize that for potential candidate countries only the first two components are available and for candidate countries all components. IPA was firstly implemented in the period of 2007-2013, with the total budget of 11.5 billion Euros. Now, IPA II is in force, for the period of 2014-2020. Its budget is equal to 14.1 billion Euros, which is an increase compared to the budget for the first IPA. Instead of 5 components, IPA II introduced the following policy areas: Reforms as a part of EU accession preparations and institutional and capacity building; Socio-economic and regional development; Employment, social policies, education, improvement of gender equality and human resources development; Agriculture and rural development; Regional and territorial cooperation.¹⁴ It should be noted that all of these policy areas are available for candidate countries, as well for potential candidate countries.

Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

The SAP component regarding regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations is realized through the network of bilateral agreements on the free trade of goods (in the framework of Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe), which in 2006 culminated in signing the multilateral Agreement on Amendment of and Accession to the Central European Free Trade Agreement that is, the so called new CEFTA- CEFTA 2006. The CEFTA was originally signed by the Visegrád Group countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) but it gradually included other countries seeking EU membership as well, and excluded countries that have already joined the EU. Now, contracting parties are Western Balkan countries that have not joined the EU yet, plus the Republic of Moldova.

¹² Mišćević, Tanja, *Pridruživanje Evropskoj uniji* [EU Association]. Službeni Glasnik, Belgrade, 2009. p. 163.

¹³ http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index.cfm/en/funding/ipa/, 28 April 2015

¹⁴ Pejović, Andrija, et al, *Vodič kroz IPA II: Instrument za pretprišupnu pomoć 2014-2020* [Guide through IPA II: Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 2014-2020]. European Movement in Serbia, Belgrade, 2014. p. 10.

Accession process

In the context of accession to the European Union, the SAA serves as the basis for implementation of the accession process.¹⁵ Therefore, after the signing of the SAA, the next step in the accession process is to apply for EU membership. Croatia was the first country to start the negotiations and so far it has also been the only WB country to accede to the EU. It became the 28th Member State in July 2013, after six years of negotiation. Other WB countries which acquired candidate status are FRY Macedonia, Serbia, Albania and Montenegro. Among these countries only Serbia and Montenegro have commenced with the negotiations. The reason why the other two countries are still waiting for the EU to approve the start of their accession negotiation is that they have not complied with all the necessary criteria, alongside other issues particular to Albania and Macedonia respectively- political instability and the conflict with Greece regarding the official name of Macedonia. One of the reasons for the slow pace of progress of WB countries on their road towards EU membership is the fact that these countries face a triple level of conditions: first, Copenhagen and Madrid criteria; second, obligations from the Stabilisation and Association Process (regional stabilisation and cooperation, cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), etc.); and third, individual obligations- enumerated in the European Partnership.¹⁶

After being granted a candidate country status, the negotiations can only start upon the unanimous decision of the European Council. Negotiations take place between ministers and ambassadors of the EU governments and the candidate country in what is called an intergovernmental conference.¹⁷ The different areas of negotiations are classified into 35 chapters, in comparison with 31 chapters in SEE countries' accession negotiation. This is due to the fact that EU law has further developed in the meantime.

Considering the different paces of the European integration of these countries, some argue that this time there would not be a "big" accession, i.e. that countries of this region will join the EU each in its own time. In this manner Marko Babić and Jacek Wojnicki argue that: The European Union does not treat the Western Balkan in its totality and will not accept it as totality but rather on the individual performance of each country of the region.¹⁸ The Croatian accession is in accordance with this stance. On the other hand, there is also a question of EU Member States' willingness to accept countries of this region, especially having the low economic and social standards in mind, not to mention the very difficult political situation and an ever growing need for the reconciliation among these countries, as well as a number of unresolved problems.

¹⁵ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/saa_en.htm, 28 April 2015

¹⁶ Mišćević, Tanja, *Pridruživanje Evropskoj uniji* [EU Association]. Službeni Glasnik, Belgrade, 2009. p. 168.

¹⁷ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/steps-towards-joining/index_en.htm, 28 April 2015

¹⁸ Babić, Marko, Wojnicki, Jacek: The Political Reconstruction of the Western Balkans. Challenges for the European Union. *The Challenges of Modern Democracy and European Integration*, Vol. 1 (2012), p. 180.

Case of Serbia

It is important to mention that Serbia was one of the constituent republics of SFRY. After the dissolution of SFRY in the beginning of the 90s, Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed a new Constitution in 1994 and thus formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The relations between Serbia and Montenegro were, especially after the change of political regime in 2000, burdened by political problems, so, with the help of the EU, FRY transformed into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. This state union was just an interim solution and in 2006 Montenegro proclaimed its independence. From this time on, Republic of Serbia continued its European integration process alone. Here it can also be mentioned that in 2008 Serbia's province, Kosovo declared its independence without Serbia's acceptance and recognition. The EU is highly involved in the facilitation of the Dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina. High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is personally involved in this High-Level Dialogue. Since 2012 this position was held by Catherine Ashton and as of 2015, by Federica Mogherini. So far, the most important agreement reached is the First agreement of principles governing the normalisation of relations in 2013. Progress in the area of normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Prishtina is essential for advancing the European future for both of them.¹⁹ This "condition" is to be monitored through the 35th Chapter of Serbia- EU accession negotiations.

After the outburst of Civil war in SFRY, the European Community introduced sanctions towards SFRY and cancelled the Cooperation Agreement with SFRY, which had been in force since 1980. Suspension of this agreement was shortly afterwards abolished for all newly independent republics, except for Serbia and Montenegro. After the signing of Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, the EU decided to suspend the sanctions against FRY. The visit of the EU representatives followed, which, along with the government's adoption of the Programme for harmonisation of Yugoslavian judicial system with the EU acquis, showed willingness of both sides to make steps towards good relations. Unfortunately, this did not lead to any concrete decision, mostly due to the fact that the Serbian government did not regard EU integration as a desirable goal.²⁰ The turbulent political and social situation led to another explosion of violence, this time on its own territory, in Serbia's province of Kosovo, which occurred in 1997 and 1998. Because of this conflict, the EU enforced sanctions upon FRY again. NATO forces bombed FRY in 1999 because of the Kosovo civil war. These air strikes lasted for 3 months. During this period, FRY did not have any formal relation with the EU. This is also a year when, on the EU initiative, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was created, with the aim of stabilizing the region and preventing conflicts. Representatives of the FRY government were not present at the inaugural conference of this pact. It was only after the 2000 change of regime in FRY when relations with the EU moved from this zero point. The new democratic government from the very beginning showed willingness to be included in the European integration process, i.e. in the Stabilisation and Accession Process. The EU recognised the democratic

¹⁹ European Commission, Progress Report: Serbia, 2014. p. 6.

²⁰ Mišćević, Tanja, *Pridruživanje Evropskoj uniji* [EU Association]. Službeni Glasnik, Belgrade, 2009. p. 176.

government's aspirations and within the month of political changes, the Framework Agreement FRY- EU, was signed. FRY was now ready to participate in SAP, which meant the following: access to the trade preferences, liberalisation of trade relations with other WB countries, inclusion into the CARDS programme and work on the preparation for the signing of SAA.²¹ The effect of the autonomous trade measures was significant, since it enabled FRY to export a number of industrial and agricultural products to the EU without customs and other restrictions. FRY also engaged in CEFTA 2006. Regarding the financial aid, FRY received 960 billion Euros through the CARDS programme, plus, 31 billion Euros from the regional component of CARDS programme. The decision on the inclusion of the FRY into the SAP was adopted at the Zagreb summit, with the establishment of Joint Consultative Task Force- CTF. The results of this group were joint recommendations on further actions and existing problems in transition process. Along with these, the Commission gave its recommendations on SAP for each country. After the Thessaloniki summit, Enhanced Permanent Dialogue- EPD was introduced in a form of direct dialogue between representatives of FRY and representatives of the European Commission. Through EPD the Commission gave a number of recommendations on adjustment of FRY policies with EU acquis.

Upon the adoption of Starting Points for the Reconstruction of Serbia Montenegro Relations known as Belgrade agreement, the Constitutional Charter and the law on its implementation was adopted in 2003, thus creating State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Jurisdiction was divided between two countries, with 5 fields of jurisdiction in the hands of the state union government- including international relations. Thus, relationship with the EU was entrusted to state union institutions. However, although the State union was in charge of negotiating and concluding international agreements and arrangements, after the consultation with state union member countries, the question of implementation of such agreement remained. Division of jurisdiction created problems in the fulfilment of the obligation in SAP. Due to these problems and the failure to establish full cooperation with ICTY, the Commission's Feasibility study for the commencement of SAA negotiations was delayed several times. To overcome this standstill, the Council adopted a new approach towards Serbia and Montenegro, called the twin-track approach. This meant that the SAA would be consisted of a main text and two annexes on deadline, a tempo of market liberalisation, and each with concomitant protocols, joint and individual declarations. Also, the twin-track approach meant that negotiations were to be realized on two levels: state union and individual country level. This led to a very complex negotiation situation. In accordance with this new approach and after the positive report of the Chief prosecutor of the ICTY, Carla Del Ponte, The European Commission adopted the Feasibility study, thus enabling the start of the negotiations for the conclusion of SAA in 2005. The complicated negotiations were accompanied with internal problems. In addition to this, the European Commission decided to call off the negotiations due to the lack of cooperation with the ICTY. "Calling off" meant that the EC postponed the continuation of negotiations. This decision was in force for 13 months. During this period, Montenegro declared independence and the

²¹ Mišćević, Tanja, *Pridruživanje Evropskoj uniji* [EU Association]. Službeni Glasnik, Belgrade, 2009. p. 177-178.

Commission resumed negotiation with this country. The resumption of negotiations with Serbia happened in June 2007, after the improvement of the cooperation with the ICTY, with the arrest of two generals, after which the new Serbian government was appointed. Finally, in April 2008, the SAA was signed. However, due to the fact that some EU Member States (mainly the Netherlands) thought that Serbia wasn't fully committed to the cooperation with the ICTY, the decision to postpone the implementation of Interim agreement and the process of SAA ratification was made. Not wanting to wait any longer, Serbia decided to unilaterally implement the Interim Agreement in 2009. After the positive mark from the ICTY Chief prosecutor Serge Brammertz, the Council decided to start the process of ratification in 2010. The first country to ratify SAA was Spain and the last was Lithuania. There have been some issues with certain countries- property dispute with Poland, rights of the Romanian minority with Romania, cooperation with the ICTY with the Netherlands and, especially, tensions with Lithuania regarding the presidency of the UN General Assembly, as well as disputes about Lithuanian investments in Serbia. After three years, the SAA finally entered into force in September 2013.

Accession negotiations

Serbia officially applied for EU membership in 2009 and was granted the candidate status in 2012. The first Intergovernmental Conference between Serbia and the EU was held in January 2014, thus formally launching the accession negotiations. The decision of the European Council to open negotiations was reached due to Serbia's progress in the reforms and its continued commitment to the normalisation of its relations with Prishtina.²² The first phase of the accession negotiation was the screening process, i.e. the analytical examination of the compliance of the Serbian legal system with the EU *acquis*. This phase ended in March 2015. Now, the next phase has to be the opening of chapters. In comparison with the Croatian negotiations where the negotiation team first opened the most undemanding chapters i.e. those in which the EU *acquis* is of small scale and easily achieved, in the case of the other WB countries, the EU decided to first open the most demanding chapters i.e. Chapter 23- Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and Chapter 24- Justice, Freedom and Security. In Serbia's case, apart from these Chapters, one of the most challenging ones will also be Chapter 35- Other issues concerning primarily the relations with Prishtina, which will also have to be opened at the very beginning. The peculiar thing about chapters 23 and 24 is that they do not have benchmarks, they are opened and negotiated according to action plans of the government, approved by the Commission and they cannot be closed until all the other chapters are finished (negotiating of these chapters is conducted parallel to the negotiation of all other chapters).

Chapter 23 covers judiciary and fundamental rights. According to the Progress Report of 2014, Serbia has a long way ahead of it. Although some progress has been made regarding judiciary and fundamental rights, e.g. the adoption of new laws and action plans, appraisal rules for judges and prosecutors, etc. Serbia is still at the very beginning of the process of improving and strengthening its judicial system and has a difficult task of establishing a genuine rule of law. The main progress to be made under this Chapter is judicial reform, with a special emphasize on making the judiciary more

²² European Commission, Progress Report: Serbia, 2014. p. 2.

efficient, accountable, impartial and independent, the reduction or abolishment of corruption, and the improvement of human and minority rights. Some of the main problems in Serbia with regard to the judicial system are political influence on judges, unclear appointment criteria for the post of judges and prosecutors, a backlog of cases, inconsistency of case law, the high average duration of proceedings, etc. Regarding the fight against corruption, there is a strong impetus in Serbian society, especially having the scale of corruption and its presence in every sphere of the society in mind, but little has been and is being done. The Anti-Corruption Agency lacks resources, the ability of adopting enforceable decisions; its recommendations are not properly dealt with by the government, just to mention some of the problems. Also, there is no full transparency of political parties' funding, no effective protection of the whistle blowers, nor are many high-profile cases before the courts concerning corruption activities. The condition of respect and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms needs to be improved. The issues that need addressing are minority rights, especially regarding Roma, who are subject to a high level discrimination in access to social protection, health, labour market and good living conditions. Concerning other minority groups, improvement has to be made regarding their representation in public administration, especially at local level and in the area of education and usage of language. Groups that also need special attention due to the fact that they cannot fully exercise their rights and/or are a subject of discrimination are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people, people with disabilities, refugees and internally displaced people, women in terms of gender equality, Roma children and children with disabilities. The deterioration of condition for the full exercise of freedom of expression is especially worrisome, which is the consequence of the state ownership of certain media, great political influence on information spread through the media and the raising trend of censorship and self-censorship in the media. The package of three laws on media is adopted but still needs to be fully implemented.

Chapter 24 covers the Area of Justice, Freedom and Security, as it addresses the following issues: migration, asylum, visa policy, judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, police cooperation and the fight against organised crime, cooperation in the field of drug and fight against terrorism. As from 2009, the visa-free regime with the EU has been in force, meaning that Serbian citizens do not need to acquire visa to travel to Schengen countries. Serbian nationals are also one of the largest groups of applicants that seek asylum in the EU, with the large ratio of these applications being dismissed. Regarding Serbia's asylum policy, progress has been made by establishing a unified national database for checking personal data and fingerprints of foreigners, as well as opening accommodation centres. However, a comprehensive reform of asylum policy is required.²³ Serbia has to step up its activities in the fight against organised crime. The major problems, in this regard, are rare convictions of organised criminal groups, weak protection of witnesses and victims, especially victims of human trafficking need to be better protected and assisted. Overall, further efforts in strengthening, managing, specializing, modernizing and controlling of policies and procedures in the area of justice, freedom and security are necessary.

As it was already mentioned, Charter 35, which comprises of various issues that are not covered by any other negotiation chapter, will be challenging for Serbia as it also

²³ European Commission, Progress Report: Serbia. 2014, p. 52.

covers the relations between Belgrade and Prishtina. Other chapters are more or less difficult and Serbia is actively preparing for their negotiation. The negotiation policies in which Serbia needs to make considerable efforts to align with the EU *acquis* are, besides Chapter 23 and 24, agriculture and rural development (Chapter 11) and environment and climate change (Chapter 27).

Serbia established three levels of negotiators for the conduction of negotiations. The first one is the State delegation participating at the Intergovernmental conferences led by the Minister for European Integration or Minister of Foreign Affairs, the second one is a core negotiating team comprised of 15 to 20 people led by the Chief negotiator Tanja Mišćević, and the third one is a wider negotiation team comprised of members of 35 negotiation groups, led by state secretaries and institution directors, which include around 600 people.

Financial support

With the aim of facilitating Serbia's efforts in taking over and efficiently fulfilling all of its obligations, the European Union and its Member States are providing financial support.²⁴ Serbia is receiving approximately 200 million euros *per annum* through IPA programme. This makes Serbia the biggest recipient of pre-accession assistance among Western Balkan countries, and the EU represents Serbia's biggest donor. With the aim of effective conduction of pre-accession assistance programming on the national level and, accordingly, more effective usage of available funds, the government of Serbia adopts the annual Action Plan for Programming and Reporting on EU Funds and Development Assistance to the Republic of Serbia.²⁵ There are as many as 600 projects in Serbia that are financed by the EU through the IPA programme. As of June 2014, Serbia has taken over the management of a number of EU projects for the first time. Most projects since 2000 are conducted in the fields of traffic infrastructure, health care, air and water quality, treatment of solid waste and judiciary and state administration reform.²⁶ Serbia is also the biggest user of European Investment Bank loans, which it mainly uses for investments in traffic sector. The country also receives funds from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development since 2009- these loans amount to 3.5 billion Euros.

EU programmes

Serbia participates in several EU programmes such as Progress, Culture, Europe for Citizens, Safer Internet, the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme. Also, Serbia has recently concluded or is in the process of concluding new agreements for a number of programmes, including: Horizon 2020, Competitiveness and Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, Erasmus +, Creative Europe, and Employment and Social Innovation.²⁷

²⁴ *Pregovaračka Poglavlja: 35 koraka ka Evropskoj uniji* [Negotiating Chapters: 35 Steps towards the European Union], EU Info Centre, Belgrade, 2014. p. 2.

²⁵ *Vodič kroz pristupanje Srbije Evropskoj uniji* [Guide through the Accession of Serbia to the European Union], International and Security Affairs Center, Belgrade, 2015. p. 37.

²⁶ *Rastemo zajedno: Najuspešniji projekti koje EU finansira u Srbiji* [Growing Together: Most Successful EU Projects in Serbia], EU Info Centre, Belgrade, 2015. p. 4.

²⁷ European Commission, Progress Report: Serbia, 2014. p. 5.

Conclusion

In conclusion, there is a long way in front of Serbia as there are so many problems to be tackled and reforms to be conducted. The process of negotiation and the alignment with the EU *acquis* is at the beginning. Although politicians like to make predictions on the exact date of Serbia's accession, it cannot be that easily predicted. The tempo of negotiations is in the hands of Serbia, i.e. its devotion to the much needed reforms and political will to make the right decisions. It can be said that there is a strong political support of Serbia's accession to the EU, as only pro-European political parties passed the threshold at the national elections and are represented at the National Parliament. But, on the other hand, it seems that the adoption of some important decisions which would fasten the reforms are delayed or not properly addressed. Regarding the public opinion on the European integration process, it can be noticed that there is a sense of fatigue, mainly due to the media representation of the whole process as a never ending conditioning. The process of EU accession cannot be truly accomplished only by the country's legal alignment and harmonisation with the EU *acquis*, but also through promoting and adopting the European values in the candidate states.

COUNTRY RISK ASSESSMENT AND THE CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL CULTURE

RALUCA ELENA ILOIE* – CIPRIAN RAUL TRIPON**

Researchers like Hofstede, Inglehart and Schwartz were analysing the effects of cultural values upon human behavior. They designed a methodology to categorize culture by different dimensions, resulting in theoretical models of organizational and national culture. Their theoretical models are intertwined, describing common problems like social inequality, social norms, survival, self-expression, traditional and religious beliefs, the relationship between individuals and groups, social and emotional implications of having been born as a boy or a girl, conservatism and harmony, or stability and perseverance. After many conceptual reasoning and statistical studies, the emphasis was more and more placed on national cultures and their dimensions. Researchers believed that all societies (modern and traditional) face the same basic problems.¹ In 1954, a broad survey of the English-language literature on national culture was published, where psychologist Daniel Levinson and sociologist Alex Inkeles suggested that issues like relation to authority, conception of self (in particular, the relationship between individual and society and the individuals' concept of masculinity/ femininity) and ways of dealing with conflicts were the basic problems worldwide.

Geert Hofstede developed the most important statistical study (1960-1970), the IBM study on cross-cultural communication, showing the effect of culture on people's values. The study was conducted regarding more than fifty countries around the world, where he discovered that different countries confront common problems. Later, he continued his study and divided national cultural characteristics into six different dimensions like:² power distance (first dimension of national culture), uncertainty avoidance (second dimension of national culture), individualism versus collectivism (third dimension of national culture), masculinity vs. femininity (fourth dimension of national culture), long- versus short-term orientation (fifth dimension) and the sixth dimension – indulgence versus restraint.

Managers, leaders, as well as people they work with – at the level of organizations – are part of national societies (national cultures). “If we want to understand their behavior, we have to understand their societies.”³

“We cannot change the way people in a country think, feel and act by simply importing foreign institutions”,⁴ because there is a “general spirit of a nation” and institutions/ organizations that function in a geographical area follow mental programs by adapting to local/ national culture.⁵

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¹ Mead, M. 1962

² Hofstede, G.; Hofstede, G. J. & Minkov, M., 2010

³ Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, 2005, 20

⁴ Hofstede, 2005, 20

⁵ Montesquieu, C.-L., 1799 [1742], 310



Corruption is the phenomenon that affects any country's social order, economic development, democracy, prosperity and institutional stability. People from different countries have different values, traditions, norms, beliefs, attitudes and behavior, even different history.⁶ These are elements that describe and form the pattern and dimensions of national cultures. Those correlations between corruption and national culture are the main reason why managers, business leaders and policymakers took a greater interest in socio-economic factors that form the complex nature of corruption. Fighting corruption means understanding these factors and the importance of national culture that serves as a guiding principle for human behavior.⁷ As many studies have revealed, cultural values have impacted and shaped business ethics,⁸ though the actual influence of national culture is still not fully understood.⁹

If we are to go further with the aim of this paper, we could say that the same elements apply to Country Risk Assessment; thus, country risk is generated by political, economic, social and institutional factors, directly related to national culture. If you want to make an assessment on country risk, you also have to do an assessment on the national culture to fully understand the dimensions of CRA. Some studies revealed that people from different cultures are accustomed to think very different about problems and concepts.¹⁰ Also, differences in national cultures may affect and prove to be correlated with differences in intellectual performance (what is simple from a point of view, may seem complex from another point of view).¹¹ Similarly, researcher Michael Cole shows in his study that a pattern of behavior that seems smart in some cultures is viewed as stupid in others.¹² Continuing in this direction and correlating it to Hofstede's dimensions of national culture, one might say that adaptation to environment is the tacit knowledge of what one needs to know and do to succeed in his actions.¹³ Country Risk Assessments will be different for each country mainly because people's behavior is related to national culture and the adaptation to the environment. The cultural context shapes the results of assessment, in this case, a country's risk assessment.

This paper mainly focuses on the dimensions of national cultures mentioned by Hofstede because, as scientists agree, organizations and their people, along with organizational cultures, are part of the national culture of the host country in which they function. Central Eastern European (CEE) countries under inspection will be: Germany, Switzerland, Poland, Austria, Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and Moldova.

National Culture

Throughout their studies, many researchers have tried to define culture as the accumulation of traditions, norms, rituals and meanings that distinguishes one group or

⁶ Barnouw, 1985; Matsumoto, 1994, 4

⁷ Kaufmann et al., 2003

⁸ Davis and Ruhe, 2003; Park, 2003; Husted, 1999

⁹ Ford and Richardson, 1994; Parboteeah et al., 2005; Seleim and Bontis, 2009

¹⁰ Nisbett 2003

¹¹ Helms-Lorenz et al, 2003

¹² Cole et al., 1971

¹³ Sternberg et al., 2001

even a society from another one. Hofstede was the first researcher to extend the concept of organizational culture to national culture and described it as “the programming of the mind acquired by growing up in a particular country.”¹⁴

“The relative position of a country on a scale from 0 (low) to 100 (highest) on each of the six cultural dimensions is a good predictor of human behavior and social norms in family and education, workplace behavior, organization of state institutions, politics, national and organizational decision making. As researchers claim, we may say that people’s way of thinking are culturally determined.”¹⁵ The 6 dimensions of national culture:

- Power distance (PDI) = “the degree of compliance with authority, the rigidity of the levels of command and the formality of interactions between organization members”,¹⁶ social inequality and the distribution of power in society, democratic or autocratic societies.
- Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) = the control of aggression and the expression of emotions; number of rules, regulations and laws and the attitude toward risk-taking. “Countries exhibiting strong UAI maintain rigid codes of belief and behavior and are intolerant of unorthodox behavior and ideas. Weak UAI societies maintain a more relaxed attitude in which practice counts more than principles.”¹⁷
- Individualism versus collectivism (IDV) = the prevailing of community values in contrast with individual values, or better said, whether there is a strong or weak relationship between the individual and the group. (*Individualism* refers to individual recognition, only caring for oneself and the closest family members. On the other hand, *collectivist* societies are described by words/expressions like “we” and loyalty; here, society members care for each other as if they were from the same family.)
- Masculinity vs. femininity (MAS) = gender and gender-related social and emotional implications. (*Masculinity* characterizes a society that is more competitive, has a preference for success, for achievement and material rewards. On the opposite side, *Femininity* means thinking of the greater good of others, a preference for modesty, “satisfaction with the position and flexibility”,¹⁸ a society that is orientated toward cooperation and consensus.)
- Long-term versus short-term orientation (LTO) = stability, perseverance, material growth, delaying gratification, orientation toward the future versus a society that has a tendency toward consumerism, is oriented toward the present and values instant gratification.¹⁹
- Indulgence versus restraint (IVR) = a society that allows its members to “live in the moment” by enjoying life and having fun opposite to a society that prefers controlling/ supervising its members through strict social norms.

“These dimensions will not directly predict any future events or nation’s dynamics, but only the understanding of what is likely to happen. Also, these dimensions have to be correlated with national history, national wealth, personalities and coincidences. They

¹⁴ Hofstede, G. 2005, 402

¹⁵ Iloie, Raluca, 2014, 758

¹⁶ Tripon, Ciprian, 2013), 25

¹⁷ <http://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html>

¹⁸ Tripon, Ciprian, 2013, 26

¹⁹ Hofstede apud Tripon, 2013, 26

are very useful when we want to see and study cases of trends, averages or expectations.”²⁰

Country Risk Assessment (CRA)

Country risk refers to political risk (government changes as democratic or non-democratic), socio-political risk (local authorities’ policy changes and social movements about country policy or foreign business), host country micro-/macroeconomic risk and natural disaster risk. Country risk also refers to “the exposure to loss that may occur in a business with a foreign partner, caused by specific events that are at least partially under country governmental control and cannot be controlled by the investment decision makers that can only predict such events and avoid risks by no investing, or opting for a form of internationalization adapted to the level of risk in the host country. Country risk level is also affected by the global political and economic situation.”²¹

Variables included in the Country Risk Assessment model are *demographic and human development* (total population, population growth rate, urban density, life expectancy, school enrolment, access to improved water sources etc.), *political stability and governance* (external conflicts, institutional effectiveness, democracy, civil and political rights, freedom of expression, corruption level etc.), *economic development – policy and structure* (infrastructures, monetary stability, fiscal policy, inflation rates, GDP, foreign direct investments, transparency of public finances, black-market, banks’ credit management, etc.), *environmental issues and legislation, international relations* (country diplomacy, cultural, commercial, or even political ties to other states).²² CRA is a macroeconomic, political and financial evaluation of 160 countries, providing an estimated risk of “a country’s potential influence on businesses’ financial commitments.”²³ The analyses ranks studied countries by their level of risk – A1, A2, A3, A4, B, C and D (A1= very low risk, D= very high risk).

Literature approaches on country risk

Terminologies	Definition of risk	Sources of risk	Nature of the investment	Historical perspective	Methodology
Political risk	Performance variance	Sovereign interference	Foreign direct investments	1960s-1970s	Qualitative & Quantitative
Country risk		Environmental instability	Banking commercial loans	1980s	
Sovereign risk	Negative outcome		Portofolio investment	1990s-?	
Cross-border risk					

²⁰ Iloie, 2014, 758

²¹ Iloie, Raluca, 2014, 8

²² Risk Assessment Template <http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/>

²³ <http://www.coface.com/Economic-Studies-and-Country-Risks>

Source: “Country Risk Assessment/ A Guide to Global Investment Strategy” (Michel Henry Bouchet, Ephraim Clark, and Bertrand Gros Lambert, 2003, p.10)

Corruption Perception Index (CPI)

Corruption is the term used for describing dishonest or unethical human behavior, illegal activities and links that lead to extortion, fraud, favoritism, nepotism, bribery or embezzlement. Corruption is mainly caused by faulty country laws, inconsistent or too complex rules and regulations, huge managerial discretionary powers, failure in holding corrupt people accountable for their actions. The Corruption Perception Index is developed by Transparency International as a measure used to classify countries by their level of abuse of power for private gain among Governmental Institutions and the integrity of people in position of authority.²⁴ The Corruption Perception Index provides a metric on the perceived levels of corruption of countries, based on multiple surveys applied to public or experts in the subject and information is available regarding 180 countries. Countries are given a score that ranges from zero to ten, a *high score* meaning *low risk of corruption* and a *lower CPI score* indicating *high corruption risk*.

Categories of corruption:

- Systematic corruption (high level institutionalized corruption – social corruption that modifies national laws, legislative norms in favor of specific private firms);
- Instrumental corruption (“big corruption” that can affect a given social institution and/or an entire economic sector);
- Incidental corruption (individual “small corruption” that doesn’t affect the majority of people of the given country).

Data and Empirical Methodology

The present article analyzes the national cultures in Central and Eastern Europe in connection with Country Risk Assessment and Corruption Perception Index. Main data were gathered from COFACE, Transparency International, Euromonitor International, data published online for the period from 2008 – 2014. Based on theoretical and empirical research, we generated two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1:

Theoretically, cultures perceived to be collectivistic, feminine, with a low power distance and a low tolerance for risks, long-term orientated and restrained, should score higher on the CRA and Corruption Perception Index than countries with an individualistic, masculine, high power distance and risk tolerance, short-term orientation and indulgent cultures (we employed the abbreviated version of Hofstede’s model because this version contains more data for longer periods of time).

Hypothesis 2:

Countries with the same national culture have similar CRA and CPI.

²⁴ Iloie, *idem*

Table 1. Corruption Perception Index, 2008 – 2013, Central Eastern Europe

	Country	Years 2008- 2009		Year 2010		Year 2011		Year 2012		Year 2013		Year 2014		2008 – 2014
		Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	
1	Switzerland	5	9	8	8,7	8	8,8	6	8,6	7	8,5	6	8,6	8,70
2	Germany	14	8	15	7,9	14	8	13	7,9	12	7,8	12	7,9	7,92
3	Austria	14	8	15	7,9	16	7,8	25	6,9	26	6,9	23	7,2	7,45
4	Slovenia	27	6,7	27	6,4	35	5,9	37	6,1	43	5,7	40	5,8	6,10
5	Poland	54	4,8	41	5,3	41	5,5	41	5,8	38	6,0	36	6,1	5,58
6	Hungary	47	5,1	50	4,7	54	4,6	46	5,5	47	5,4	47	5,4	5,12
7	Czech Rep.	49	5	53	4,6	57	4,4	54	4,9	57	4,8	53	5,1	4,80
8	Slovakia	54	4,8	59	4,3	66	4	62	4,6	61	4,7	54	5	4,56
9	Croatia	64	4,2	62	4,1	66	4	62	4,6	57	4,8	61	4,8	4,42
10	Romania	71	3,8	69	3,7	75	3,6	66	4,4	69	4,3	70	4,3	4,02
11	Bulgaria	72	3,7	73	3,6	86	3,3	75	4,1	77	4,1	69	4,3	3,85
12	Serbia	84	3,4	78	3,5	86	3,3	80	3,9	72	4,2	78	4,1	3,73
13	Moldova	99	3,1	105	2,9	112	2,9	94	3,6	102	3,5	103	3,5	3,25
14	Ukraine	140	2,3	134	2,4	152	2,3	144	2,6	144	2,5	141	2,6	2,45

Source: Own computation based on data from Transparency International and Euromonitor International

Scores are presented on a scale from 0 to 10; Meanings: 0 = Highly Corrupt; 10 = Very Clean

The Ranking in Table 1 is based on studies about corruption in 180 countries for the time period from 2008-2009, 178 countries surveyed in 2010, 183 countries surveyed in 2011, and 177 countries included in the Corruption Index for the period of 2012-2014. We calculated an Average Score of CPI for the time period of 2008-2014 to understand better and classify/ sort the studied CEE countries into classes. Here we can observe that the “cleanest” countries (or the less corrupt ones) are: Switzerland with a CPI score of 8,70 out of 10, Germany with a CPI score of 7,92 out of 10 and Austria with 7,45 out of 10. They are followed by Slovenia (6,10 CPI score); then, just above the medium CPI scores or just above “medium corrupt countries”: Poland (5,58 CPI score out of 10) and Hungary (5,12 CPI score out of 10). Countries perceived as corrupt are the following: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia and Romania, then even more corrupt countries follow: Bulgaria (3,85 CPI score), Serbia (3,73 CPI score) and Moldova (3,25

CPI score). The most corrupt country in our analysis is Ukraine, with a score of 2,45 out of 10. During the time period of 2008 – 2014, there were no big changes in the corruption score of countries regarding their economies and institutions.

Table 2: Country Risk Assessment, 2011 – 2014, Central Eastern Europe²⁵

Country/Region	Assessment Year 2011 -2012		Assessment Year 2013 – 2014	
	Country Climate	Risk/ Business	Country Climate	Risk/ Business
Switzerland	A1/A1		A1/A1	
Germany	A2/A1		A1/ A1	
Austria	A2/ A2		A1/A1	
Poland	A3/A2		A3/A2	
Czech Republic	A3/ A2		A4/ A2	
Slovenia	A3/A2		A4/A2	
Slovakia	A3/A3		A3/ A2	
Hungary	B/A2		B/A2	
Croatia	B/A4		B/A3	
Romania	B/A4		B/A4	
Bulgaria	B/A4		B/A4	
Serbia	C/C		C/C	
Moldova	D/C		D/C	
Ukraine	D/C		D/D	

Source: COFACE, own computation

A1=VERY LOW RISK;
A2=LOW RISK;
A3=QUITE ACCEPTABLE RISK;
A4=ACCEPTABLE RISK;
B=SIGNIFICANT RISK;
C= HIGH RISK;
D=VERY HIGH RISK

Table 2 depicts the same trend, *Switzerland* being assessed as a *country with very low economic, political, social, institutional and business climate risk*, followed by *Germany*, then *Austria*. Little has changed for the time period of 2011 – 2014 for these countries regarding country risk and business climate risk. There is *quite acceptable country risk* and *low business risk* in *Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia* and *Czech Republic*, with a small change for the last two ones` between the years of 2013-2014, changing from countries with quite acceptable risk into countries with acceptable risk. *Romania* and *Bulgaria* have a *significant country risk* with an *acceptable risk for business climate*. Although *Hungary* also has a *significant country risk*, it has a *low risk on business climate*. Countries with the *highest degree of country and business climate risk* are: *Serbia, Moldova* and *Ukraine*.

Figure 1. Representation on 6 dimensions of National Cultures – 14 CEE countries²⁶

Scale: 0 – 100 (from 0 – 50 = low score, 51 – 100 = high score)

²⁵ Iloie, Raluca, 2014, 7

²⁶ Iloie, Raluca, 2014, 760





Figure 1 presents the scores of CEE countries' national culture, on all dimensions (Power Distance, Individualism vs. Collectivism, Masculinity vs. Femininity, Uncertainty Avoidance, Long-term Orientation vs. Short-term Orientation and Indulgence versus Restraint). We can see that Germany, Switzerland, Poland, Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia have high scores on Individualism (IDV) and Masculinity (MAS). The same countries plus Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia, have high scores on Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI). Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia have low scores on Individualism and Masculinity dimensions. Power Distance (PDI) scores are low for Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Hungary, and high for Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Serbia and Slovenia. Data about these dimensions are not available for Ukraine and Moldova. We only have two countries that "manifest" Short-term Orientation, namely Poland and Slovenia, and also only 2 countries that score high on Indulgence versus Restraint dimension (IVR) – Switzerland and Austria.

Figure 2. SPSS statistical representation of country groupings around the world, in clusters with similar national culture, based on the 6 cultural dimensions (PDI, IDV, MAS, UAI, LTO, IVR).



Source: www.geerthofstede.com, Own SPSS computation

From Figure 2 we can extract and group countries from around the world that have similar national culture. The grouping contains 7 major clusters, as follows:²⁷

- Cluster A: Australia, United States, Canada, New Zealand, Ireland, Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Nederland;
- Cluster B: Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Africa West, Trinidad & Tobago;
- Cluster C: Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia;
- Cluster D: Germany, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Czech Republic, Poland, Japan;

²⁷ Iloie, Raluca (2014), pp.762

- Cluster E: Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Hong Kong, India, China, Singapore;
- Cluster F: Africa East, Thailand, Arab Countries, Morocco, Iran, Chile, El Salvador, Portugal, Uruguay, Peru, Slovenia, Brazil, Turkey, Spain, Malta, Greece, Argentina;
- Cluster G: Korea South, Taiwan, Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Russia, Bangladesh, Pakistan.

Slovakia's national culture can be included in any of the other clusters, except cluster A, moreover, Ukraine and Moldova do not appear in any of the clusters because there isn't sufficient data about all dimensions of their national culture.

Data Analysis

Hypothesis 1

We need to verify if Hypothesis 1 is true and if (based on Hofstede's model of national culture) countries with a feminine, collectivistic, democratic, low tolerance for risks, strict social norms for the "greater good" of all, oriented toward future type of culture are, in fact, related to higher scores on the CRA and Corruption Perception Index than countries with a individualistic, masculine, tolerance for risk taking, less democratic, oriented toward present and indulgent cultures. Higher scores on CRA and CPI mean very low country risk and less corruption.

Table 3: CEE's countries scores on Hofstede's six dimensions – 14 CEE countries

Analyzed Countries	Power Distance	Individualism vs. Collectivism	Masculinity vs. Femininity	Uncertainty - Avoidance	Long-term vs. Short-term Orientation	Indulgence versus Restraint
Switzerland	Low	High	High	High	Long term	High
Germany	Low	High	High	High	Long term	Low
Austria	Low	High	High	High	Long term	High
Slovenia	High	Low	Low	High	Short Term	Low
Poland	High	Low	Low	Low	Short Term	Low
Hungary	Low	High	High	High	Long term	Low
Czech R.	High	High	High	High	Long term	Low
Slovakia	High	High	High	High	Long term	Low
Croatia	High	Low	Low	High	Long term	Low
Romania	High	Low	Low	High	Long term	Low
Bulgaria	High	Low	Low	High	Long term	Low
Serbia	High	Low	Low	High	Long term	Low
Moldova	High?	Low?	Low?	High?	Long term	Low
Ukraine	High?	Low?	Low?	High?	Long term	Low

Source: www.geerthofstede.com, Own computation

We can see that Germany, Switzerland, Poland, Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia have high scores on Individualism (IDV) and Masculinity (MAS) dimensions. The same countries plus Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia

have high scores on Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI). Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia have low scores on Individualism and Masculinity dimensions. Power Distance (PDI) dimension scores are low for Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Hungary, and high for Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Serbia and Slovenia. Data about these dimensions are not available for Ukraine and Moldova. Only Poland and Slovenia have Short-term Orientation and also only 2 countries score high on Indulgence versus Restraint dimension (IVR), namely Switzerland and Austria.

Switzerland, Germany and Austria have very good scores on both indexes but are individualistic and masculine which, in our hypothesis, would have suggested poorer scores on CRA and CPI. Moreover, countries like Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia which have a high level of uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation have low scores on CRA and CPI (again in contradiction with our initial suppositions). Hungary is another example of empirical data contradicting theoretical assumption: it scores low on power distance and high on uncertainty avoidance and it has long-term orientation, thus, it should have good CPI (it is in the middle – 5,12) and CRA (B-rank, significant risk).

On the other hand, Switzerland, Germany and Austria have low power distance, low risk-tolerance and long-term orientation and they DO have good CRA and CPI scores. Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia have a high score for power distance and they DO NOT have very good CRA and CPI scores. Comparing the data presented above with each country's CRA and CPI rating, we can observe that *our initial hypothesis is not supported by the data in its entirety or it is only supported to a low extent.*

Hypothesis 2

In order to verify if countries with the same national culture have the same CRA and CPI, we need to analyse the dendrogram – figure 2. We will only discuss those clusters which include CEE countries.

Cluster D:

Germany, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Czech Republic, Poland, Japan;

From the point of view of CRA:

- ❖ Switzerland – A1 and stationary
- ❖ Germany – A2 in 2011-2012 and A1 2013-2014
- ❖ Hungary – B and stationary
- ❖ Czech Republic – A3 in 2011-2012 and A4 in 2013-2014
- ❖ Poland – A3 and stationary
- ❖ Austria – A2 in 2011-2012 and A1 in 2013-2014

From the point of view of CPI:

- ❖ Switzerland – average score 8,70; variation between 8,5 and 9
- ❖ Germany – average score 7,92; variation – 8 and 7,8
- ❖ Hungary – average score 5,12; variation – 4,6 and 5,5
- ❖ Czech Republic – average score 4,80; variation – 4,4 and 5,1
- ❖ Poland – average score 5,58; variation – 4,8 and 6,1 (continuous growth)
- ❖ Austria – average score 7,45; variation – 6,9 and 8

Discussion:

We can observe that there is no consistency for countries that, from the point of view of their national cultures, belong to the same cluster. Their CRA index varies from B to A1 and there is no pattern in its evolution, either. No consistency in CPI scores, either. They fluctuate from 5,12 to 8,70. There is no common pattern of evolution, either (only Poland exhibits continuous improvement), apart from the fact that the variations of CPI for all countries do not exceed one point.

Cluster G:

Korea South, Taiwan, Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Russia, Bangladesh, Pakistan.

From the point of view of CRA:

- ❖ Romania – B and stationary
- ❖ Serbia – C and stationary
- ❖ Bulgaria – B and stationary
- ❖ Croatia – B and stationary
- ❖ Russia – no data

From the point of view of CPI:

- ❖ Romania – average score 4,02; variation – 3,6 and 4,4
 - ❖ Serbia – average score 3,73; variation – 3,3 and 4,2
 - ❖ Bulgaria – average score 3,85; variation – 3,3 and 4,3
 - ❖ Croatia – average score 4,42; variation – 4 and 4,8

Discussion:

This group is more coherent than the previous one. We only have two categories (B's and one C) and their tendency is the same – stationary. This seems to support our initial hypothesis from the point of view of CRA. Continuing with our analysis, the Corruption Perception Index shows that countries in this cluster are more closely packed together, CPI ranges from 3,73 to 4,42. Still, there is no discernible pattern in CPI's evolution.

Cluster F:

Africa East, Thailand, Arab Countries, Morocco, Iran, Chile, El Salvador, Portugal, Uruguay, Peru, Slovenia, Brazil, Turkey, Spain, Malta, Greece, Argentina;

From the point of view of CRA:

- ❖ Slovenia – A3 in 2011-2012 and A4 in 2013-2014
- ❖ Slovakia – A3 in 2011-2014

From the point of view of CPI

- ❖ Slovenia – average score 6,10; variation – 5,7 and 6,7
- ❖ Slovakia – average score 4,56; variation – 4 and 5

Discussion:

Slovenia and Slovakia seem to have similar type of national culture and almost similar scores on CRA and CPI. Slovakia is an exception because its' national culture

dimensions can be included in any of the other clusters, except cluster A (Australia, United States, Canada, New Zealand, Ireland, Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands). This group neither proves, nor disproves our initial hypothesis, the data is simply inconclusive.

Ukraine and *Moldova* do not appear in any of the clusters because there isn't sufficient data about the 6 dimensions of their national culture.

The data at our disposal *does not seem to wholly support our initial hypothesis*. For cluster D, the situation is clear: according to the data, the hypothesis is not confirmed.

For cluster G, the situation is more interesting: there appears to be a sort of cohesion among the countries. Possible explanation: their scores on the 6 dimensions of Hofstede's model are closer than the scores for countries in cluster D. We can stipulate that this data only partially supports our hypothesis.

Conclusions

As discussed previously, our initial hypotheses are only partially supported by the information available to us. This, in and by itself, might be the most interesting finding of this research: our initial hypotheses were sound, based on literature and logic. For example, high scores in PDI (less democratic countries) are related to bribery and scandals that are usually covered up in corrupt countries – easy to do, since high PDI means an autocratic regime and significant power in the hands of the higher-ups. In countries that manifest Masculine culture people live in order to work and there are more opportunities for high earnings and competitive manufacturing on national level – hence, a potential for higher risk-taking behaviour which should mean high CRA scores. Moreover, high scored UAI countries like law and order, dislike ambiguity and chaos, have more specialists in organizations which like precision and formalization – lower CRA scores and a propensity toward ethical behaviour. The other dimensions of Hofstede's model are similarly correlated with CRA and CPI – it all seems logical but the data says otherwise. If it were to summarize our findings regarding this hypothesis, we could say that there seems to be little connection between national culture and CPI and CRA, however, there are correlations between several dimensions of Hofstede's model and the level of corruption and risk of a country if we analyze those dimensions separately and only for some countries.

The situation is the same for our second hypothesis – countries with similar national cultures should have similar CRA and CPI scores. The data mostly disproves this statement, too.

The findings mostly do not support our hypotheses, so a question must be asked: why is this happening? Could it be that CRA and CPI, being complex indexes, are comprised by items that do not take into consideration national culture? Or that they include questions and items regarding only some of the main characteristics of national culture (such as power distance, risk-tolerance and long-term/vs. short-term orientation, these being of the most interest from a business point of view)? And, if so, are they an accurate measure of any countries' real behaviour and potential?

Or, on another line of thought, maybe the population/sample that provided answers for CRA/CPI on one hand, and national culture on the other, is so different that this is the reason for our findings?

These two questions represent the continuation of this article.

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GEOENGINEERING

AND WEATHER MODIFICATION PROGRAMS

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OR ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE?

GIANNA MERKI

The aim of this research paper is to outline the scope of geoengineering and weather modification programs in contemporary world, especially in terms of: 1) their role in environmental protection, specifically in mitigating the negative impact of global warming and 2) their potential usage as means of environmental warfare.

The main questions set before this study mind the actual viability of weather modification and geoengineering, the application and development of activity in the two above mentioned areas and the verification of concerns raised over these programs.

The paper starts by clarifying key points concerning the definition of geoengineering and weather modification programs, addresses their background origin traced back to the 1940s and develops further by introducing the debate on the usage of such programs for countering global warming, finally overviewing the potential usage of these programs for warfare purposes.

The interest and importance of the topic is based on the growing worldwide environmental and security-related concerns over further deployment of geoengineering and weather modification technologies, especially considering that they mostly occur beyond wider scientific and public approach. The nature of geoengineering and weather modification practices is largely unknown to the general public, despite many countries already having programs aimed at developing and conducting some more simple forms of manipulating weather patterns.

Within the frame of the paper, its concluding part offers the findings reached and points out other possible emerging questions and considerations for future research.

Definition and concept

Questions regarding geoengineering, also known as climate engineering, start with the definition of the concept itself, which has been re-shaped, particularly recently, as will be seen hereinafter.

The Encyclopaedia Britannica explains geoengineering as “the large-scale manipulation of a specific process central to controlling Earth’s climate for the purpose of obtaining a specific benefit”.¹

Climate stands for the state of the atmosphere during a longer period of time and weather corresponds to the conditions of the atmosphere in a short period of time (temperature, humidity, precipitation, wind, air pressure, etc.), therefore, weather conditions are parts of the climate – its short-term component.

¹ Boyd, Philip “Geoengineering – Earth science” *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Last updated on 14-12-2014, retrieved on 5 April 2015 from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1527153/geoengineering>.



Weather modification stands for “the deliberate or the inadvertent alternation of atmospheric conditions by human activity, sufficient to modify the weather on local or regional scales”.²

Latu sensu geoengineering/climate engineering can be understood as a deliberate intervention (engineering) to change weather conditions affecting the natural dynamics of the planet and consequently the climate on a long term. Weather modification programs, on the other hand, stand for a “lighter” type of engineering not aiming to directly affect the climate as a whole but rather specific weather patterns (rain, hail) in a given region/area.

When it comes to goals, it has been argued that the main objective of geoengineering today is to counter the global warming effect by “cooling down the Earth”. Geoengineering also has recently been defined as the means to reduce global warming – by cooling the earth through radiation balance.³ The question whether geoengineering can be or cannot be considered as a means of reducing global warming is quite controversial; I will further explain this issue in this paper.

As regards weather modification programs, these cannot be considered as synonyms of countering global warming, since the latter one only became a hot topic decades after the first scientific weather modification experiments started. Also, the term *global warming* was used in 1975 the first time in a natural sciences article written by Wallace Broecker⁴ (it was priorly named “inadvertent climate modification” which indicates that weather modification programs were not created to reduce global warming but for other purposes which can be related, for example, to agriculture – such as protection of crops).

Still, within the aim of clarifying definitions, global warming refers to the change (increase) in air temperature near the Earth’s surface, which affects the climate,⁵ while climate change means changes induced in the climate due to transformations in the atmosphere,⁶ namely due to the carbon dioxide increase.

² Battan, J.Louis “Weather Modification” *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Retrieved on 22 April 2015 from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/638346/weather-modification>.

³ Long, Loy, Morgan (2015) Start Research on Climate Engineering *Nature International weekly Journal of Science* Volume 518, Issue 7537, available online at <http://www.nature.com/news/policy-start-research-on-climate-engineering-1.16826>.

⁴Information obtained from: Conway, Eric – What’s in a Name? Global Warming Vs. Climate Change *NASA Website*, published on 12-5-2008, retrieved on 07/04/2015 from http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/climate_by_any_other_name.html. The article of Wallace Broecker: Broecker, Wallace, S (1975)– Climatic Change: Are we on the brink of a pronounced Global Warming? American Association for the Advancement of Science. Science, New Series, Vol. 189, No. 4201 pp. 460-463. Retrieved online on 22 April 2015 from <http://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/files/2009/10/broeckerglobalwarming75.pdf>.

⁵ Mann, E. Michael “Global Warming” *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Last updated on 04-02-2015, retrieved 30 March 2015 from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/235402/global-warming>.

⁶ Jackson, T. Stefan – “Climate Change” *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Last updated on 27-06-2013, retrieved on 6 April 2015 from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/121632/climate-change>.

The origin of scientific weather modification programs

The origin of the idea of manipulating the weather is quite old when it comes to the agricultural point of view, however, the modernity of scientific weather modification programs can be said to have started in the 1940s with scientists Vincent J. Schaefer and Irving Langmuir dropping crushed pellets of dry ice from an airplane originating precipitation.⁷ Scientist Bernard Vonnegut further demonstrated it in the late 1940s that silver iodide could be used for the same purpose.⁸ These experiments marked the beginning of cloud seeding experiments, which, as seen, involve dispersing chemicals – typically silver iodide or dry ice from airplanes into clouds allowing for precipitation enhancement.

Furthermore, several other experiments were attempted namely what became known as the Cirrus Project in 1947, in which the US Army, US Air Force and General Electrics aspired to modify a hurricane which allegedly changed route and ended up in Savannah, Georgia.⁹ Cyclones have been seeded with silver iodide in an attempt to weaken them by North-American scientists in the scope of *Project Stormfury*, which was discontinued in 1983 due to not being fully conclusive or successful.¹⁰

In 2008, weather modification took place at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games, for which, according to MIT Technology Review, clouds were sprayed with silver iodide and dry ice before reaching Beijing, so that it rained even before it reached the city.¹¹ Also, China has used cloud seeding to obtain clear skies for particularly important national days such as the National Day Parade in China at Tiananmen Square, where over 400 rockets were fired in 2009 to ensure good weather for the event¹².

Russia has also seeded clouds several times for major celebrations, again, to obtain clear blue skies effect.¹³ Apparently, these activities might also have their own risks: according to Reuters, in 2008, one of the 12 Russian Air Force planes carrying silver

⁷ Battan, J.Louis “Weather Modification” Encyclopaedia Britannica, Retrieved on 22 April 2015 from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/638346/weather-modification>.

⁸ Ahrens, Donald C and Henson, Robert (2013) *Meteorology Today – an Introduction to Weather, Climate and the Environment* p. 117. Brooks/Cole, Cengage Learning, Boston, USA

⁹ Fitzpatrick, Patrick, J (2006) *Hurricanes: A reference handbook*. 2nd edition. Pp.123. ABC CLIO. Santa Barbara, California, USA.

¹⁰ Battan, J.Louis “Weather modification” *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, last updated on 19-02-2014, retrieved 07 April 2015 from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/638346/weather-modification>.

¹¹ Williams, Mark “Weather Engineering in China- How the Chinese plan to modify the weather in Beijing during the Olympics, using supercomputers and artillery”. MIT Technology Review 25-03-2009. Retrieved online on 22 April 2015 from <http://www.technologyreview.com/news/409794/weather-engineering-in-china/>.

¹² Watts, Jonatan “China’s Weather Modification Works Like Magic – Beijing transformed by clear blue skies after massive cloud seeding operation” The Guardian 01/10/2009. The Guardian News and Media Limited. Retrieved online on 5 April 2015 from <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2009/oct/01/china-cloud-seeding-parade>. and “Largest Cloud seeding effort to prevent rainfall on parade” Window of China 01-10-2009. Xinhua News Agency. Retrieved on 30 March 2015 from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-10/01/content_12139802.htm.

¹³ Moskvitch, Katya “Russia Appeal of Weather Control” BBC NEWS 26-03-2010. Retrieved on 25 March 2015 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8587725.stm>.

iodide, liquid nitrogen and cement powder to seed clouds for the Russian National Day, did not completely release their content (namely cement powder), pulverized in the air, having the non-pulverized cement fallen on a house, causing damage in it.¹⁴

Besides, the official military usage of this technology, there are also some private companies both in the United States and Russia working on weather medication: namely, Weather Modification Inc., in the U.S.A,¹⁵ as well as Russian companies which are allegedly hired for special celebrations such as weddings in order to ensure the desired good weather for the event.¹⁶

Can geoengineering be used to counter global warming? Environmental considerations

As mentioned previously, groups of researchers such as David Keith has nowadays considered geoengineering as a mean to reduce global warming.¹⁷ Unlike him, other scientists oppose the usage of geoengineering to fight global warming, explaining that it can have worse effects on destabilizing the environment than on protecting it and that it is not certain that climate manipulation can actually help counter the problem. To be more accurate, scientist Mike Hulme is against the usage of weather technology for reducing global warming which he explains in detail in his book, entitled “Can Science fix climate change? It is a case against climate engineering, in which he states that technology and science are not the solution in this case and that these should serve more pragmatic goals such as improving air quality or achieving energy technology transition.¹⁸

Nature scientific journal – highly regarded and cited in the field of natural sciences. In its article entitled *Policy*, it calls out to *start research on Climate engineering* as very little is known about the effectiveness of geoengineering and about its consequences, stating that “One country's interventions will affect others and could distract from climate-change mitigation efforts, and there is no international mechanism for regulating such deployments,”¹⁹ which seems like a clear problem to everyone concerned with the environment and the environmental impacts of geoengineering.

¹⁴ “In Russia sometimes it rains cement” REUTERS 17-06-2008. Thomson Reuters. Retrieved on 28 March 2015 from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/06/17/us-russia-weather-idUSL1760049120080617?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&rpc=22&sp=true>.

¹⁵ “Company Overview of Weather Modification, Inc” Bloomberg Business. Bloomberg LP. Retrieved on April 7 2015 from <http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=6837140>.

¹⁶ Moskvitch, Katya “Russia Appeal of Weather Control” *BBC NEWS* 26-03-2010. Retrieved on 25 March 2015 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8587725.stm>.

¹⁷ Interview by John Grolle. “Cheap but imperfect: Can Geoengineering slow climate change?”. Spiegel Online International 20-11-2013. SPIEGEL. Retrieved on 15 March 2015 from <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/scientist-david-keith-on-slowing-global-warming-with-geoengineering-a-934359.html>.

¹⁸ Hulme, Mike (2014) – “Can Science fix climate change?: A case against climate engineering”. Polity Press, USA.

¹⁹ Long, Loy, Morgan (2015) Start Research on Climate Engineering *Nature International weekly Journal of Science* Volume 518, Issue 7537, available online at <http://www.nature.com/news/policy-start-research-on-climate-engineering-1.16826>.

On the other hand, considering geoengineering as indispensable, statements from the *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* in 2013 affirm that even if green-house emissions would substantially be reduced, geoengineering would still be needed and required as regards the reduction of carbon-dioxide in the atmosphere – by injecting reflective particles into the stratosphere to control global temperatures and preserve the ecosystems.²⁰

Regarding the topic of countering climate change and global warming, it is worth noting that according to the United Nations and FAO's reports from 2006, the leading cause of climate change and global warming is livestock raising, producing more greenhouse gas than the whole transportation sector worldwide.²¹ It could also be countered in a more simple form, by globally reducing animal product consumption and production, which has, however, been largely ignored.²²

Returning to the main focus of this paper, the previously mentioned article from *Nature* defends that controlled climate engineering/geoengineering research should commence now, (2015) since it might take scientists decades to gain a solid understanding of these subjects. According to the article, proposals on these matters should respect the considerations of value, risk, transparency, vested interest and legal considerations.

On the other hand, in 2010, The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) stated in Documents on Weather Modification that “since the 1980's there has been a decline in support for weather modification research, and a tendency to move directly into operational projects”.²³ The same organization claimed in 2010 that there were “dozens of nations operating hundreds of weather modification projects, particularly in arid and semi-arid regions all over the world”.²⁴ These projects, however, do not directly seem to be, at least in the majority of the cases, oriented towards climate modification on a long term, having rather short term goals as precipitation enhancement or suppression, hail suppression, fog dispersal or others.

²⁰ Long, Loy, Morgan (2015) Start Research on Climate Engineering *Nature International weekly Journal of Science* Volume 518, Issue 7537, available online at <http://www.nature.com/news/policy-start-research-on-climate-engineering-1.16826>.

²¹ “Rearing cattle produces more greenhouse then driving cars, UN report warns” *UN News Centre*. United Nations News Centre 26-11-2006. Retrieved on the 22 March 2015 from <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsID=20772#.VSjjYckXLw0> ; Castel, Gerbe ,Haan, Rosales, Steinfeld and Wassenaar – Livestock's Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options Rome, Italy: FAO 2004

²² See – *Conspiracy: The Sustainability Secret* – Dir. Kip Anderson and Keegan Kuhn. 2014. Documentary

²³ *Documents on Weather Modification*. World Meteorological Organization, 2010,pp. 3. Retrieved on 3 March 2015 from http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/arep/wwrp/new/documents/WMR_documents.final_27_April_1.FINAL.pdf.

²⁴ Documents on Weather Modification. World Meteorological Organization, 2010,pp. 4. Retrieved on 3 March 2015 from http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/arep/wwrp/new/documents/WMR_documents.final_27_April_1.FINAL.pdf.

In 2013, a catalogue of countries being active in weather modification activities was presented by the WMO, showing the source and the type of engagement of each of these countries – the list of 42 countries and activities can be seen in a footnote.²⁵

According to the same report of the WMO the countries which, in 2013, invested the most in weather modification programs (both operational and research programs) were China, followed by USA, Thailand and India.²⁶

As previously presented, these weather modification projects mentioned by the WMO are not aimed at resolving the global warming issue (as the climate research mentioned in Nature) and are not perceived as “large scale” interventions. However, it is also urgent to research on their environmental impact, since they are carried out to obtain more favourable weather conditions in a certain country/region by selectively changing weather patterns.

Weather modification programs as a potential means of environmental warfare

Besides the environmental considerations, it is also important to analyse the threat to international security deriving from the possible usage of geoengineering or weather manipulation programs as tactic means.

Since the early stages of the development of weather modification programs in the 1960s, some scientists highlighted their potential dangers and their possible usage as weapons. To be exact, geophysicist and member of President Johnson’s Science Advisory Committee, Dr. Gordon J.F. MacDonald predicted *the development of technologies that will use the planet as a weapon* and that these would fully be developed in the XXI century.²⁷

Between 1967 and 1972, the *Operation Popeye* took place in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In this operation the US military caused torrential downpours and droughts by cloud-seeding that constrained troop movements in their favour by blocking enemy routes. This information was later verified by the disclosure of *The Pentagon Papers* and by investigative journalist, Jack Anderson.²⁸ The weather was in fact manipulated for military purposes in South East Asia already back in the 1970s.

In 1972, the US renounced the use of climate modification techniques for hostile purposes and in 1973, the Senate passed a resolution calling for an international agreement a base to start negotiations with the Soviet Union on this topic. In 1974, both parties agreed to hold bilateral discussions, coming up with draft texts in 1975 at the Conference for the Committee on Disarmament, which would set the foundations

²⁵Bruintjes, Roelof (Chairman) and Expert Team, Report from Expert Team on Weather Modification Research for 2012/2013 pp. 2-6. Geneva, Switzerland, WMO (2013) CAS/WWRP/JSC6/Doc 3.6

²⁶ Page 5 of *Report from expert team on weather modification research for 2012/2013*, Retrieved on 3 March 2015 from http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/arep/wwrp/new/documents/Doc_3_6_weather_mod_2013_Final_tn.pdf

²⁷ Gordon J. F. MacDonald (1968) *How to Wreck the Environment* – Ed. Calder, Nigel (1968) *Unless Peace Comes, a Scientific Forecast of New Weapons*. New York, USA, Viking Press.

²⁸ *The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War – a Political, Social and military history*, “ pp. 921. Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2nd Edition 2011.

for the text of the *Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques* (also called ENMOD Convention) adopted by the UNGA in its resolution 31/72 of 10 December 1976 and opened for signature and ratification from 1977.²⁹

The Convention entered into force in 1978 and specifies that it shall have an unlimited duration.³⁰ From the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – the main organ responsible for ensuring international peace and security³¹ – the USA, the Soviet Union (today Russia,) the Peoples Republic of China and the United Kingdom ratified the treaty, while France did not sign or ratify it. A further view on the ratifying States can be found above.³²

Following the Vietnam War, the two Cold War superpowers (the US and the Soviet Union) were said to have turned to a different type of cold war – competing in being able to manipulate ionosphere and magnetosphere through electro pulses.³³ Particular breakthrough was made by both sides in conducting experiments with Very Low Frequency (VLF) and Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) radio waves. ELF transmitters were used to manipulate ionosphere –action performed in a certain place leading to altering the weather below. Once emitted, the VLF or ELF waves leave an incision in the ionosphere upon impact. These signals cause streams of particles to fall down far away from the transmitter in the outermost regions of the atmosphere with only a minor loss of signal, thus affecting the motion of free electrons and leading to electronic rain that alters weather patterns.³⁴ Although the USSR was initially far more advanced in the field of ELF transmitters, with the collapse of the state many projects were abandoned and the USA remained in the lead as regards this research.³⁵

In 1995, the HAARP (High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program) project was introduced as a scientific and academic program aimed at researching properties of

²⁹ Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD). United Nations Office at Geneva. UNOG. Retrieved on 22 April 2015 from <http://www.unog.ch/enmod>.

³⁰ See Article VI of the ENMOD Convention – Convention on the prohibition of military and other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. New York 10, December 1976. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1108, p. 151 and depositary notification C.N.263.1978. Retrieved online on 2 April 2015 from https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVI-1&chapter=26&lang=en

³¹ See Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations.

³² *Convention on the prohibition of military and other hostile use of environmental modification techniques*. New York 10, December 1976. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1108, p. 151 and depositary notification C.N.263.1978. Retrieved online on 2 April 2015 from https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVI-1&chapter=26&lang=en.

³³ Belford Group Citizens in Action (2010) "Case Orange – Contrail Science, Its impact on Climate and Weather Manipulation Conducted by the United States and its allies" Compiled by the Belford Group, Evergem Belgium, page 50.

³⁴ Belford Group Citizens in Action (2010) "Case Orange – Contrail Science, Its impact on Climate and Weather Manipulation Conducted by the United States and its allies" Compiled by the Belford Group, Evergem Belgium, page 52.

³⁵ Belford Group Citizens in Action (2010) "Case Orange – Contrail Science, Its impact on Climate and Weather Manipulation Conducted by the United States and its allies" Compiled by the Belford Group, Evergem Belgium, page 51

Aurora Borealis (Northern Light) and manipulating it to enhance communication and surveillance systems both for civilian and defence purposes. However, some scientists considered it controversial such as Rosalie Bertell who, for example, expressed concerns several times in the 1990s and 2000s regarding that scientists were continuing to work on weather modification systems as potential weapons. In 1996 she stated that “It would be rash to assume that HAARP is an isolated experiment which would not be expanded. It is related to fifty years of intensive and increasingly destructive programs to understand and control the upper atmosphere. It would be rash not to associate HAARP with the space laboratory construction which is separately being planned by the United States. HAARP is an integral part of a long history of space research and development of a deliberate military nature”.³⁶

The HAARP website seems to have been shut down and access to it is currently not available for further information.

According to Professor Michel Chossudovsky, at the moment, the US has such advanced capacities that it can selectively alter weather patterns. This technology has been worked on by HAARP – *High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program*, which can operate from the outer atmosphere and destabilize agriculture and ecosystems around the world, being therefore considered by Michel Chossudovsky as a weapon of mass destruction.³⁷

Besides HAARP’s main facilities in Alaska (which are said to be currently closed), it has been claimed that its activities are spread in different parts of the world within several other smaller weather modification facilities, not only within the US but also in several other countries.³⁸

In 2002, members of the Russian general assembly, the so-called *Duma* expressed concerns about HAARP as new type of weapon and demanded a ban on these experiments. This appeal was said to have been sent to Vladimir Putin, to the UN, as well as to parliaments and leaders of UN countries.³⁹

Regarding other forms of using weather modification as a weapon, it is essential to mention a report of the *Air University*, which is the intellectual and leadership centre of the North-American air force and provides an accredited military educational system. One of the chapters of this report conducted in 1995-96 for the Air Force Chief of Staff – “*Weather of a Force Multiplier: owning the weather in 2015*” – gives evidence of intentions of manipulation of weather against “enemies” and to “enhance friendly forces”. It goes on stating that “In the United States, weather-modification will likely

³⁶ Betrell, Rosalie. *Background of the HAARP project*. EarthPulse.com. 2005-2015 Earth Pulse Press. Retrieved on April 11 2015 from <http://www.earthpulse.com/src/subcategory.asp?catid=1&subcatid=1>.

³⁷ Chossudovsky, Michael. *The Ultimate Weapon of Mass Destruction: Owning the Weather for Military Use. Global Research*. GlobalResearch.ca. 27 September 2004. Retrieved on 3 April 2015 from <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-ultimate-weapon-of-mass-destruction-owning-the-weather-for-military-use-2/5306386>.

³⁸ *HAARP Coordinates and Explanation*. Geoengineering Watch. 2015 Geoengineering Watch. 3 December 2012. Retrieved on 17 March 2015 from <http://www.geoengineeringwatch.org/haarp-coordinates-and-explanation/#more-7388>.

³⁹ *Russian Parliament concerned about US plans to develop new Weapon*. Moscow Interfax 2002. Document Number: FBIS-SOV-2002-0808. Retrieved on 10 April 2015 from <http://fas.org/irp/program/collect/haarp-duma.htm>. and Smith, Jerry E (2006) *Weather Warfare: The Military’s Plan to Draft Mother Nature*. Pp.188. Adventures Unlimited Press. Illinois, U.S.A.

become a part of national security policy with both domestic and international applications. Our government will pursue such a policy, depending on its interests, at various levels. These levels could include unilateral actions, participation in a security framework such as NATO, membership in an international organization such as the UN, or participation in a coalition. Assuming that in 2025 our national security strategy includes weather-modification, its use in our national military strategy will naturally follow. Besides the significant benefits an operational capability would provide, another motivation to pursue weather-modification is to deter and counter potential adversaries.”⁴⁰

The disclaimer prior to the report sustains that the statements contained in it are of responsibility of its authors. However, the fact that this report is elaborated for the above-mentioned purpose, as well as its contents already show evidence of the type of policies, ideals and existence of weather manipulation structures for military purposes in the US.

In 1997, US Secretary of Defence William S. Cohen stated that some states “are engaging... in an eco-type of terrorism whereby they can alter the climate, set off earthquakes, volcanoes remotely through the use of electromagnetic waves”,⁴¹ alerting for the possibility that certain other states might use weather manipulation programs for their private purposes, in a conference on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and U.S. Strategy.

In 2010, the Russian Navy (Russian Northern Fleet) released a report claiming that a test carried out by the US Navy created the earthquake in Haiti. The same report mentions that there is a plan to destroy Iran through successive earthquakes. These systems being tested by the HAARP could also allegedly create floods, droughts and hurricanes.⁴² Other claims come namely from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of Iran, who has publicly stated that *Western countries have designed plans to cause drought in certain areas of the world, including Iran*”.⁴³ However, as no clear proofs are officially presented, these statements remain public accusations between states.

In an interview by Spiegel in 2013, the renowned scientist David Keith, who favours geoengineering research to counter global warming, explains its benefits and dangers mentioning his strong opposition to the usage of geoengineering technology for

⁴⁰ Celentano, House, Husband, Mercer, Pug, Shields. Weather as a force multiplier: Owning the Weather in 2025. A Research Paper Presented to Air Force 2015. August 1996. Retrieved online on the 3 March 2015 from <http://csat.au.af.mil/2025/volume3/vol3ch15.pdf>.

⁴¹ News Transcript, Press Operations. DoD News Briefing: Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen. 28 of April 1997. US Department of Defense. Retrieved on 3 April 2015 from <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=674>

⁴² “Haiti: The U.S created the earthquake in Haiti? Pravda.ru 24-01-2011. PRAVDA.RU. Retrieved on 29 March 2015 from Haiti – ‘The US created earthquake in Haiti?’ (2010) Pravda Newspaper online, available at: http://english.pravda.ru/science/tech/24-01-2010/111809-russia_says_us_created_earthqua-0/.

⁴³ Henderson, Barney. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says Europe 'stealing Iran's rain'. The Telegraph 21-05-2011. Telegraph Media Group Limited. Retrieved online on 23 March 2015 from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/8527455/Mahmoud-Ahmadinejad-says-Europe-stealing-Irans-rain.html>

military purposes but recognizing that the more “tailored” the technology gets, the stronger and more serious chances will be of its usage for military purposes.⁴⁴

Conclusion

As regards geoengineering as a tool of environmental protection in the fight against global warming, it seems possible to scientifically debate whether these programs can actually help mitigating its effects, although it should be taken into account that there are other ways of trying to reduce global warming and climate change, moreover, further research is needed to fully understand its potential in these terms.

As for environmental warfare, however, it is difficult to accurately real-time track the use of weather modification weapons, given the fact that its dimensions and proofs are relatively scarce and evidence is difficult to obtain, environmental warfare does not seem unconceivable. If it is certain and proven that weather modification was already used for warfare purposes back in the 1970s and that since then technology has been in continuous development, weather modification programs for warfare purposes should be at least a subject to attentively consider and to carry out further research on.

Weather modification processes are essential to address and to take into account since they can be a threat to both international peace and security and to the environment.

Moreover, incentivising the UN member states which did not sign the Convention of 1976 on the *Prohibition of the Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques* to do so is important, as well as taking action in a preventive way, to avoid the future misuse of environmental techniques in contemporary and modern conflicts.

Just as with nuclear proliferation, weather modification experiments and geoengineering shall be internationally debated and regulated before experiments reach an uncontrollable level and cause irreversible negative consequences to humans and to the environment.

Research and operational projects shall be closely observed, framed and regulated within international global governance forums, rather than only on a national level without international accountability.

⁴⁴ Interview by John Grolle. “Cheap but imperfect: Can Geoengineering slow climate change?”. Spiegel Online International 20-11-2013. SPIEGEL. Retrieved on 15 March 2015 from <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/scientist-david-keith-on-slowing-global-warming-with-geoengineering-a-934359.html>.

